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Abstract

This paper examines the role played by Chinese Buddhists, especially the so-called "progressive Buddhists," in the socialist transformation of the sangha at the early stage of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). I concentrate on the case of Ven. Juzan (1908–1984). While the focus on one individual does not reveal the whole story about Chinese Buddhists’ involvement in the Chinese Communist Party’s project of reshaping the sangha, the career of Juzan does provide a window on the issue. By exploring various sources, including Modern Buddhist Studies (Xiandai foxue) and government documents, I investigate how Juzan urged his fellow Buddhists to work with the Communist leadership, and how he justified government policies on Buddhism by reinterpreting Buddhist doctrines. In so doing, this study intends to show that Chinese Buddhists’ collaboration with the Communist regime was a significant dimension of the socialist transformation of the Chinese sangha, a process that laid the foundation for full-scale persecution of Buddhism during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

Introduction

It is commonly accepted that Chinese culture has exerted an enormous impact on the development of Buddhism since it entered
China at the end of the Han dynasty (206 BC–AD 220). And it is also generally believed that socialist reconstruction in the earlier period of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) dramatically transformed the Chinese sangha. Thanks to the efforts of Western scholars such as Holmes Welch, some pioneering research has been carried out to dwell on how the People’s government forcibly implemented its policy on religion through various political campaigns, and how the monastics were remodeled through Marxist studies conducted by local cadres. Yet such research, done in the pre-1976 period, is far from sufficient, due to the lack of available information. In addition, mainly for political reasons, not much—in fact, virtually nothing—has been said about the sangha’s socialist restructuring in the early 1950s. (1)

This paper examines the role played by Chinese Buddhists, especially the so-called "progressive Buddhists," (2) in the socialist transformation of the sangha at the early stage of the People’s Republic of China. I concentrate on the case of Ven. Juzan巨贊 (1908–1984). While the focus on one individual does not reveal the whole story about Chinese Buddhists’ involvement in the Chinese Communist Party’s project of reshaping the sangha, the career of Juzan does provide a window on the issue. By exploring various sources, including Modern Buddhist Studies (Xiandai foxue 現代佛學) and government documents, I investigate how Juzan urged his fellow Buddhists to cooperate with—or even to surrender to—the Communist leadership. In addition, I also examine how he justified government policies on Buddhism by reinterpreting Buddhist doctrines. In so doing, I show that Chinese Buddhists’ collaboration with the Communist regime helped shape the socialist transformation of the Chinese sangha, (3) a process that laid the foundation for full-scale persecution of Buddhism during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

**Buddhist Proposals for Reform**

The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. On September 29 of the same year, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) passed the Common Program,
which served as the first constitution of the PRC. Article 5 states that Chinese citizens have freedom of religious belief along with freedom of thought, speech, assembly and association, and procession and demonstration. This article looks rather abstract and ambiguous, as it does not explain the specific contents of religious belief. In other words, the government enjoyed absolute power to define the meaning of the article. (4) The People’s government at this time aimed to transform old China into a new socialist nation, making every effort to reeducate the Chinese people in general and religious followers in particular through Marxist studies. The goal was to cultivate all of them as good citizens of new China. Article 5 therefore became a very useful legal tool, creating flexibility for the state when it intended to control religion. Nevertheless, the government policy on religion would not have been successfully implemented among Buddhists if progressive Buddhists like Juzan had not extended their support and cooperation.

Juzan’s household name was Pan Chutong 潘楚桐. Drawn to socialist radicalism as a college student in Shanghai, he began to take part in Communist-led activities in 1929. Later, he was wanted by the Nationalist government. To escape, he went to the Lingyin Monastery in Hanzhou and met Taixu 太虛 (1898–1947), who recommended that he receive the tonsure under Master Quefei 却非 (1873–1948), one of the revolutionary monks who participated in the fighting against the Qing army in Shanghai in 1911. After the tonsure, Juzan studied in various Buddhist institutes and soon became a promising young monk, respected for his knowledge about Buddhism and enthusiasm for Buddhist reform. In the Buddhist circle, he was always identified as a follower of Taixu. But he was disappointed by the sluggishness and ineffectiveness of Taixu’s reform program and launched a New Buddhist Movement (Xinfojiao yundong 新佛教運動) in the mid-1940s (Juzan, 1940: 8–14; 1941a: 6–8; 1941b: 6–7; 1941c: 17–19). (5)

During the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), Juzan was deeply involved in organizing Buddhist activities against the Japanese invasion in Hunan, and then he went to Guilin to organize Buddhist propaganda against Japan. Together with some other young
revolutionary monks, he started the monthly publication of the *Roaring Lion* (*Shizihou*), calling for rapid reform of the sangha and Buddhist participation in the current war. According to Juzan and many other progressive monks, institutional Buddhism and the Chinese sangha were corrupted, and only a fundamental reform and social involvement could save it from extinction. The war, as they saw it, may have provided an opportunity for such reform.

In the spring of 1948, Juzan met some of his Communist friends in Hong Kong and discussed the Buddhist reform movement in China, where the Communist takeover seemed imminent. Uncertainty about the Buddhist future may have led to his determination to go to Beijing, as he expressed in a letter to his friend Dao’an 道安, "this is the crucial moment for the survival of Buddhism… How could I step aside and let it die out?" (Dao’an, 1990: 237). In April 1949, Juzan went to Beijing with the mission of "securing a good position for Buddhism in new society" (Shi Xingron, 1995: 216). Meanwhile, he drafted a comprehensive plan for Buddhist reform and sent it to the Communist Party in the North, emphasizing the shifting of Buddhist activities to economic productivity and doctrinal studies.

In September 1949, Juzan attended the first meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and became more active and passionate in advocating Buddhist reform in connection with the socialist reconstruction of China. In 1950, together with some leading Buddhists in Beijing, he founded the journal *Modern Buddhist Studies* (*Xiandai fóxué*), (6) which I shall discuss later. His activism for Buddhist reform, however, may have agitated some Buddhists, and the government may have been alarmed at his over enthusiasm. As a result, the Party leaders became suspicious about his proposal for the reform and cautiously endorsed his efforts.

After being elected one of the vice-secretaries of the Chinese Buddhist Association founded in 1953, Juzan’s influence in Buddhist affairs gradually decreased as new leadership emerged at the center with Zhao Puchu 趙樸初 (1907–2000), who was to
become one of the best-known lay Buddhists in China. Juzan was later sentenced as a counterrevolutionary by the government and jailed in 1967. He was not released until 1980 and passed away on April 9, 1984. Juzan’s activities in the early PRC both shaped and were shaped by the socialist transformation of Chinese Buddhism, which eventually resulted in the demise of the sangha in the years to come.

Institutional Buddhism in the early period of socialist China faced tremendous problems and imminent dangers. Monks and nuns in general were frightened of the new regime, for rumors had already been widely spread before 1949 that Communists had carried out the destruction of Buddhism in liberated zones. Yet, Juzan ignored all these rumors and decided to work with the Communist government with a hope that the new regime might provide an opportunity for Buddhists to end the continuing decline of Buddhism through self-reform.

In the middle of 1949, Juzan and twenty-one other eminent monks and lay Buddhists in Beijing sent a joint letter to Chairman Mao and the leaders of other parties, calling for the nationwide reform of Buddhism. Four points were highlighted in that letter: 1. All Buddhists have expressed their admiration and appreciative joy over the dawn of the new era. 2. Buddhists would like to give ten thousand thanks to the Chinese Communist Party for eliminating feudalism and superstition, which have long defiled the sangha, and Buddhists are looking forward to a new life. 3. Buddhism, unlike other religions, is atheism, and it advocates the realization of the doctrines of non-self and serving others. Therefore, it is comparable to the spirit of the time (Marxism). The appearance of a new form of Buddhism in China would facilitate the liberation of Tibet and Taiwan, where Buddhism is much revered. New Buddhism will also help promote diplomatic friendship with neighboring Buddhist countries, thus contributing to world revolution. 4. A movement of "shifting to production" and "shifting to scholarship" should be carried out among the sangha so that the feudal system and superstitious beliefs could be destroyed, and backward Buddhists could be transformed (Welch, 1972: 395–396).
Juzan’s proposal did not receive any positive reply, for the Communist Party was then still searching for an appropriate policy on Buddhism. On June 28, 1950, the government issued the Land Reform Law, which specifically stated that temple lands should be requisitioned for redistribution among peasants (Xianggang fojiao lianhehui, 1967: 92). Although the law indicated that the temple lands should be “requisitioned,” a movement of reorganizing temples for public uses and confiscating temple lands at random spread all over Communist China. The movement shook the very foundation of the existence of the sangha, because traditionally the livelihood of monks and nuns was largely dependent upon the rents of temple lands. In their struggle for the survival of the sangha, sporadic protests were carried out by individual Buddhists against this state-launched movement nationwide. It has also been noted, nevertheless, that majority of monks and nuns did not resist, some of them even willingly collaborated with the government. When informed of the incidents that monks and nuns resisted the land reform, Juzan was rather disappointed for he believed land reform would provide an opportunity of a reshaping of the sangha, and his advice to his fellow monks and nuns was that they should actively organize themselves to form productive labor groups as the government demanded.

How should monks and nuns be persuaded to follow the government order and voluntarily undertake socialist transformation? Juzan once discussed with the deputy mayor of Beijing, Zhang Youyu 張友漁, the possibility of forming a nationwide Buddhist organization to lead the sangha during this transitional period. With the concurrence of Zhang, Juzan quickly drafted a proposal for setting up a Buddhist organization and submitted it to the United Front Department of the central government, which was then in charge of religious affairs. Unexpectedly, an official there told him that it would be premature to form such an organization, and two main reasons were given: first, the central government was still considering whether it was advisable to create a Buddhist organization to handle Buddhist affairs; and second, the Religious Affairs Division of the CPPCC National Committee had not yet begun to function. At this time, the
government was still searching for trusted leaders within Buddhist circle, who could act as proxies for the implementation of its policy on Buddhism.

The Communist Party and the People’s government would certainly be reluctant to approve such reform, as they refused to be rushed to the formation of a clear policy on religion in general and Buddhism in particular. In following the Marxist view on religion, the state believed that Buddhism as well as all other religions would finally disappear in China in the course of socialist construction and scientific developments. As the Party leadership saw it, its duty was to indoctrinate Buddhists with the Marxist scientific worldview, and to eradicate their superstitious mentality. Of course, the Party also understood that it would take time for people to abandon their religion. It also clearly saw that dramatic reform and forceful change would increase resistance from Buddhists and, for this reason, be detrimental to government administration in the long run. Therefore, the government decided that it would not openly and specifically call for the reform of the sangha, but claimed to integrate monks and nuns into the socialist family of the nation. Meanwhile, other Buddhist leaders, either out of their knowledge about the government’s true intention or their own suspicion about the Communist reform, articulated their preference for cautious actions. They believed such reform should not take place until the government formulated its more specific policy on religion in general and Buddhism in particular, allowing more time for the alleviation of uncertainty and fear among Buddhists.

In June 1950, a group of Buddhist representatives in the second meeting of the CPPCC gathered in the Guangji Monastery to discuss the issues of Buddhist reform proposed by Juzan. A large number of participants expressed their doubt as to whether it was the right time for such reform. Zhao Puchu called Juzan’s reform proposal the draft of a draft, which needed much more discussion, while Sherab Gyatso 喜饒嘉措 (1884–1968), who was elected Chairman of the Chinese Buddhist Association in 1954, suggested that the word "reform" should not be used lightly for Buddhism, as it might cause misunderstanding in Tibet even though it looked all right to the
Chinese (Han). In the end, Juzan was persuaded to modify his proposal, and its title was changed from "Suggestions for Buddhist reform" (Gaige fojiao yijianshu改革佛教意見書) to "Suggestions for the Reform of Buddhist Affairs" (Zhongguo fojiao jiaowu gaige yijianshu中國佛教教務改革意見書), indicating that only the organization of Buddhism should be reformed. It was then agreed among Buddhist leaders and government officials that more investigation and research should be undertaken before any concrete action was taken.

While Juzan expressed his deep concern about the future of Buddhism amid political upheaval in 1948, he now in the early 1950s chose to argue that Buddhist self-reform was for the religion’s survival and revival. Apparently, he overestimated the government’s interest in Buddhism, and as evidenced in the later development of Buddhism in China during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1967), he miscalculated the government’s true intention, which was to eliminate all religions. Nevertheless, Juzan never lost his confidence in the government and continued to demonstrate his enthusiasm for Buddhist reform. He then proceeded to organize the Association for Issues of Buddhism (fojiao wenti yianjiuhui佛教問題研究會, later renamed Beijing Buddhists’ Study Class), Buddhist symposiums, and training classes for monks and nuns. Through these activities, Juzan proposed a twelve-point program for establishing a new type of public monastery (xin conglin新叢林) and laid down the foundation to build a gunnysack factory for monks and nuns in Beijing (Welch 1972, 390–407). All these measures would, as Juzan explained his religion in socialist terms, wake up monks and nuns, who would develop fully the revolutionary spirit of Sakyamuni, realize the imminent urgency for self-reform, rid themselves of feudalist mentality, and follow the socialist leadership of the Party. Under the persuasion of Juzan, 238 major monasteries in Beijing produced their plans for such study and reform (Juzan 1950, 20).

In the middle of 1950, the government began to pay more attention to the proposals of Buddhist reform and the founding of a nationwide Buddhist organization. Several meetings and symposiums were organized by the Religious Affairs Division to
discuss these matters. On many occasions, Juzan passionately expressed his gratitude toward the Communist Party and his support for the government. He stressed that the government provided a great opportunity for Buddhist reform, and yet Buddhists had not been able to break completely with the feudal tradition. He criticized Chinese Buddhists for their failure to formulate any serious plan for self-reform, and for their lack of commitment to serve the people. After expressing his disappointment in Chinese Buddhists, he urged them to act immediately in response to the government’s call for change: "We believe that Buddhism of the past was inextricably bound up with feudalism and that Buddhist mentality and behaviors were largely superstitious and backward. Therefore we sincerely support the Common Program. Under the leadership of the government, we should fight imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. We are determined to cleanse the Buddhist circle against all remains of parasitism, indolence, pessimism, and escapism, which obstruct the development of socialism. We should recover the revolutionary spirit of primeval Buddhism, which, for its pragmatism, promises to become a force in the reconstruction of the new nation" (Welch, 1972: 403).

Perhaps because of its strategic decision not to represent Buddhist reform officially as reform, the government seemed to expect that the spontaneous change of the monks and nuns would take place through socialist transformation of China as a whole. By considering the members of the sangha no different from other Chinese and as citizens of the new nation, the government demanded they undergo socialist transformation, as all other Chinese people had to do the same. By the end of 1951, the socialist transformation of institutional Buddhism had successfully taken place nationwide, and monks and nuns remodeled themselves and became productive laborers on farms and workers in factories. Juzan highly praised this phenomenon, considering it the right path (zhengdao 正道) to resuffle the sangha and the right practice to work for the interest of the people (Juzan, 1952: 3). He highlighted the importance of Marxist studies and thought reform, and stressed that once Buddhists grasped the Marxist thoughts on labor and creation of a
human world, class struggle, and the state, all other problems would be solved automatically.

**In Defending the People’s Government**

Although Buddhist leaders were unable to reach agreement on Buddhist reform, their meetings with government officials increased mutual understanding between the Buddhist community and the state. After several discussions, a consensus was achieved that Chinese Buddhists should be informed of changes launched by the state and the necessity of political studies so that they could attune both their thought and behavior to contemporary socialist reconstruction. It was then decided to set up the Modern Buddhist Study Publishing House to publish a monthly journal called *Modern Buddhist Studies*. Chen Mingshu 陳銘樞 (1889–1965), who was to became a rightist in 1957, was the director. Juzan, the chief editor of the journal, used a number of pen names for his articles that appeared in *Modern Buddhist Studies*, including Baojie 宝衢, Yuzhi 育之, Wanjun 萬均, and Zhaoxin 周信. Other popular contributors included Mingzhen 明真 (1902–1989), Liang Sicheng 梁思成 (1901–1972), Li Jishen 李濟深 (1885–1959), and Sherab Gyatso (7). The first issue was published in September 1950. Its circulation started at seven hundred copies and rose to four thousand within a short period, and subscriptions were received from abroad. The wide circulation of the journal helped Juzan become one of the best-known monks to many Chinese Buddhists.

While *Modern Buddhist Studies* published articles on a range of topics, including philosophy, literature and the arts, and history, it mainly served as a mouthpiece for the government to implement its policy on Buddhism, and a platform for Buddhists to undergo self-reform. It was aimed at transmitting government policies and directives in dealing with matters related to Buddhists, reexamining Buddhist doctrines from a scientific-historical viewpoint, correcting erroneous ideas and false practices in Buddhist circles so as to advance the reform of Buddhist organization, and establishing links with Buddhists at home and abroad to maintain peace and people’s democracy (*Xiandai fuxue* 1950, 1, 1: 32). (8)
Although a main objective of the journal was to bridge the gap between institutional Buddhism and the government, it was not a place for Buddhists to make suggestions regarding government policies or to vent their complaints against the government. Nevertheless, a reader’s column was opened for people to ask questions, with the replies provided in the next issue. Readers often reported that local cadres rampantly confiscated their temples or destroyed Buddhist properties, and sought help and intervention from leading Buddhists. Yet, under various pen names, Juzan advised them not to ask what the government could do for Buddhism, but how Buddhists could contribute to the nation by participating in socialist reconstruction. He urged them to practice the doctrine of self-sacrifice based on the Buddhist concept of non-self, preventing them from protesting the government. When a reader asked why the lands belonging to Buddhist temples were confiscated while those of mosques were unaffected during land reform, Juzan did not directly answer the question, but reminded Buddhists that this was completely in agreement with the land reform law, which specifically permitted land reservation for mosques. Juzan warned that anyone who thought that such a practice should be equally applied to Buddhist temples might not have understood the government policy properly, and this kind of misunderstanding may also have revealed that one’s thought was still backward and that more Marxist studies were needed (*Xiandai fóxué* 1950, 1, 1: 29). (9)

Juzan was eager to demonstrate his support for the government policy on Buddhism, while other Buddhists considered this policy discriminatory. He even openly spoke on behalf of those local cadres who were accused by Buddhists of oppressing Buddhism. As mentioned earlier, the policy on freedom of religious belief was very ambiguous and its implementation depended largely on how local cadres interpreted it. Buddhists often expressed that they could hardly grasp the meaning of freedom of religious belief. As a result, they could not practice their religion anymore as they were almost helpless in the face of persecution at the local level. Some wrote letters to *Modern Buddhist Studies*, pleading for help from
Buddhist leaders in Beijing. Yet they were also told by the editors of the journal, with Juzan as the chief, that the central government was sincerely thinking of protecting Buddhism, and its policy on Buddhism was sufficient, although some local cadres may have misunderstood the intention of the central government and its policy. Therefore, what Buddhists should do was to engage in self-criticism for their own self-transformation. They should, the journal emphasized, focus on whether they should give up temples and lands that local cadres had rightly demanded in accordance with government policy.

In June 1950, a proposal was circulated among the participants in the meeting of the World Buddhist Fellows held in Sri Lanka that urged the leaders of the Chinese government to pledge to be the guardians of Buddhism. Fafang 法舫 (1904–1951), who participated in the meeting, sent the proposal to Juzan and asked him to submit it to the People’s government (Juzan, 1952a: 4). A discussion then took place among Buddhist leaders and government officials, who unanimously agreed that individual guardians were not necessary, as freedom of religious belief had already been guaranteed in the Common Program. Juzan further explained that any sort of special guarantee for Buddhism would invite unnecessary competition among different religions, and thus actually limited freedom of religious belief. In feudal society, kings and emperors acted as guardians of either Buddhism or Daoism, but they were motivated by the political purpose of using Buddhism as a tool for exploitation. The Communists, he emphasized, would never do the same.

In June 1954, a new constitution draft was passed. Article 88 stated: "The citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief." A debate had long been going on among legislators and religious followers whether this article should be more specific, recognizing the freedom of performing religious rituals. Those who participated in the debate, including Juzan, quickly arrived at the consensus that freedom of religious belief should not be specified, because only then could religions make use of this absence of specificity for their own advantage and benefit. They claimed that since the liberation, some people had put up resistance to the state,
impeding productive activities and interfering with government administration. It might encourage backward activities within religious circles if the freedom of conducting religious rituals was specified in the constitution. It would also create conflicts between ordinary Chinese and religious followers, thus eventually harming the freedom of religious belief (Juzan, 1954: 14). Juzan believed that freedom of religious belief was sufficiently guaranteed even though Article 88 contains only seventeen Chinese characters, and such straightforward policy would in fact put aside any doubt for religious practitioners in following the instruction of the Party.

Juzan reiterated that Buddhists in China had enjoyed sufficient freedom, even though the government policy appeared rather simple. Buddhist rituals could still be performed in temples, publications such as Modern Buddhist Studies could be seen in public, and Buddhist relics and monuments were protected by the government. Juzan questioned why there should be a more specific policy, and he strongly believed that the central government had made sincere efforts to protect the freedom of religious belief. Even if some local cadres might have committed mistakes in dealing with Buddhism, they should not be blamed for unfortunate incidents. Why? Because they were in fact innocent, for they did not know what Buddhism was. A reason for their not knowing Buddhism was because Buddhists had failed to explain it to them. Therefore, it was Buddhists who created such problems and should be responsible for the destruction of Buddhism. Juzan reiterated that instead of criticizing local cadres and asking for more specific policy, Buddhists should ask themselves what more they could do positively for the country so as to express their appreciation for the government policy on the freedom of religious belief (Xiandai foxue 1950, 1, 2: 30). (10)

Juzan defended the government and urged Buddhists to study the constitution draft and act accordingly. Yet studying the constitution draft was not for self-protection but rather for self-surrender, and a deep appreciation for the leadership of the Communist Party, which had made the constitution draft available. In the article "Our Constitution Draft Is the Right Dharma to Provide Great Happiness
for the People,” Juzan praised the constitution draft as if it were a concrete manifestation of the ideal thought in Buddhist scriptures, especially the *Sutra on the Contemplation of the Mind in Mahayana Jatakas* (*Daicheng bensheng xindiguanjing*大乘本生心地觀經). The source states, as Juzan cited, that a sage king equipped with Dharma would enable all people to enjoy peace and happiness. The king treats all people equally as if they were his children. Endowed with ten virtues, he protects them day and night. (11) Nevertheless, people cannot enjoy their lives with peace, wealth, and happiness, nor will their wishes be fulfilled, unless they honor and assist this virtuous king with a wholesome mind, just as they honor and assist the Buddha. Juzan believed that Chairman Mao could be compared to such a sage king, even though the two should not be regarded as the same. He asked all Chinese Buddhists to pay homage to Mao and follow his guidance as if he were a sage king in Buddhism. He continued: “It is important to study the draft of our constitution in light of wisdom of the sutras. This is because Chairman Mao has personally guided its formulation, which is the right Dharma aimed at providing ‘great happiness and peace for people.’ This is also because ‘virtuous people have gathered together to discuss state matters’” (Juzan, 1954a: 4).

Having thus received the kindness of Mao and other Communist leaders, monks and nuns should repay them by willingly undertaking socialist transformation of their feudalist nature. The first step was to admit that they had in fact lived parasitic lives before, and to readily repent for it through self-criticism. When a monk asked whether monastic members should be considered to be proletarians since they had already renounced the world and given up worldly things, Juzan categorically rejected this idea and pointed out that monastic members in China, unlike those in India, had not lived their lives begging for food, nor had they participated in agricultural activities (he admitted, however, that some had done so in the Tang and Song dynasties). Although ordinary clergy might not be taken for the feudal class, they definitely could not be considered members of the proletariat because they certainly had benefited from the rent of temple lands without tilling the land.
Abbots were the representatives of temples, and thus belonged to the landowning class, because anyone who did not perform productive labor was a member of that exploitative class (*Xiandai foxue* 1950, 1, 1: 29). (12) By categorizing monks and nuns as the non-proletarian class in the middle of the class-struggle movement, Juzan encouraged them to accept the reality and voluntarily give their lands to farmers as if they were practicing Buddhist generosity, which would certainly result in double blessings of self-merit and other’s benefit (*Xiandai foxue* 1950, 1, 6: 29). (13)

Shortly after the establishment of the PRC, the phenomenon of decimation of the sangha was seen throughout China, and the Land Reform Movement once again forced a large number of monks and nuns to leave their temples. One reader from Siquan reported to *Modern Buddhist Studies* in August 1951 that more than three hundred monks used to live in a temple at the beginning of the liberation in 1949. One year later, several dozens of them joined the Volunteer Army and went to Korea while others left the temple, and only sick and old ones remained. He expressed his worry about the future of Buddhism. Juzan, however, told the reader that the reduction of monks and nuns would not cause any problem for Buddhism. He provided an example of the sangha in the early Tang dynasty when the ordination was controlled by the state through strict examination and Buddhism thrived. Yet, a huge size of the sangha with more than three million monks and nuns in the mid-Tang China caused a severe state persecution (*Xiandai foxue* 1950, 1, 6: 29). (14) Juzan believed that the development of Buddhism does not depend on the quantity but rather the quality of the sangha; the reduction of the sangha would rather stimulate its spiritual life and generate a favorable environment for Buddhist revival.

Appreciative joy (suixi 隨喜) is one of four Brahmanvihara that Buddhists practice (other three are loving-kindness, compassion, and equanimity), and it is generally believed that Buddhists appreciate and encourage each other’s spiritual cultivation. Yet progressive Buddhists advised their fellow monks and nuns to sacrifice their religious practice or even suspend their belief for the
sake of maintaining uniformity with other Chinese people and harmony with the state. A monk once complained that it was difficult for him to conduct religious practices anymore, as he had to be fully engaged in agricultural activities. Other peasants would accuse him of being superstitious if he secretly recited the name of the Buddha. Instead of encouraging him to continue such practice, Juzan suggested that Buddhists may not necessarily recite Buddha’s name or chant sacred words with the mouth, but work hard through their body in daily productive labor together with other ordinary Chinese (Xiandai foxue 1950, 1, 6: 29). (15)

Chinese people were urged by the government to undertake criticism and self-criticism in exposing their feudal thoughts so that they could evolve into new citizens of socialist China. Juzan advised monks and nuns not to refuse the public criticism of Buddhism’s backwardness, because Buddhist practices in fact were full of superstitious and feudalist elements (Xiandai foxue 1951, 1, 8: 31). (16) Therefore, they should readily reform their past lives in accordance with the Marxist ideology. Juzan cited an example of moving fish from one pond to another. When pond A dried out, fish must move to pond B and adapt to the new environment. Buddhists, who had moved from feudalist China to socialist China must readjust themselves for survival. By selflessly following the path of the Party, Buddhists might not worry about Buddhism, as its future would then be guaranteed by the government. Juzan analyzed:

First-class people would not ask about the future but straightforwardly walk into the future; second-class people would understand contemporary affairs and struggle for the future; and third-class people brood over the present but will have no future. Why should we be concerned with the future [of Buddhism]? It is no use doing so if Buddhism is not the truth. Why should you worry about the future if Buddhism is the truth, as the truth simply cannot be defeated? Although a deep concern about the future of Buddhism may show one’s religious commitment, it indicates one’s ignorance that one does not have sufficient faith in this religion.” (Juzan, 1950: 23)
At the beginning of 1951, a campaign to suppress heterodox Daoist sects (*Huidaomen*會道門) got under way throughout China. Local cadres did not discriminate between Buddhism, Daoism and folk religion, and carried out severe persecution against Buddhism. They destroyed Buddhist images and occupied temples in the name of anti-superstition and suppressing counterrevolutionaries. Once again, progressive Buddhists advised monks and nuns to not resist the campaign, but to cooperate and to expose heterodox elements inside Buddhism, as only then could the government provide due protection and justice for the sangha. They never advised them to exercise their right given in the Common Program to defend their religion and belief. Instead, they advised their fellow monks and nuns to give up unoccupied and disused spaces in temples as requested by the government (Welch, 1972: 51), simply because it was their duty to make their due contributions to the nation through self-sacrifice. Thus, the crux of the problem was not whether the government had lawfully or unlawfully occupied Buddhist temples, but whether Buddhists had made the best use of their temples for the nation (*Xiandai foxue* 1951, 1, 9: 27).

Buddhism has no future if Buddhists defy the leadership of the Communist Party and resist government orders, according to Juzan, because they are in fact blessings for Buddhism. Juzan could not understand why Buddhists should worry about socialist transformation, and warned that Buddhist resistance and disobedience would not only be useless, but also could bring disaster to Buddhism. Anyone who harbored such thoughts and took such action was considered anti-Communist and counterrevolutionary, which were the most serious crimes at the time. Daoist sects, for example, were designated as counterrevolutionary and heterodox, not because of their doctrine and practice, but because their members refused to cooperate with the People’s government. Therefore, it was vitally important that Buddhists learn a lesson from these Daoist sects. Not only should they avoid making those mistakes of the counterrevolutionary and heterodox Daoist sects, but they must also struggle hard against them in public, demonstrating their support for the government.
In October 1951, a reader reported to *Modern Buddhist Studies* that local cadres converted his temple in Chongming 崇明 into a public school without any explanation. Juzan reassured the reader that the government would not take temples away unless the abbots were consulted. Yet he repeated that many temples had more than enough space and buildings with few monks, and it was perfectly all right to turn unused temples into public schools and government office (*Xiandai foxue*, 1950 1, 6: 29). (20) It is quite obvious from the reader’s question that his whole temple was confiscated without his being consulted, yet Juzan did not provide any direct answer to the question of how he could defend himself and protect his temple, but suggested that monks and nuns voluntarily give their unused temples to the government. Not only must Buddhists comply with socialist transformation, according to him, but they should also be grateful to the Communist Party and Chairman, who had liberated them from the bondage of feudal society, where Buddhism had been contaminated with superstition and feudalist ideology. Only in the new era under the Communist leadership could Buddhists break off feudal bondage and live pure lives again.

Socialist transformation of Buddhism during this period was effective for various reasons. One of them was that progressive Buddhists like Juzan collaborated with the People’s government to implement the state’s socialist agenda in the sangha. Although it is difficult to determine what other monks and nuns thought about the progressive monks’ support for the government, monks like Juzan did create a pro-government voice in the monastic community. The truth is that in less than two years, large numbers of monks and nuns were reorganized into cooperative teams and participated in productive labor, and many of them got married but continued to stay inside their temples. Some of them undertook self-transformation so thoroughly that they refashioned their monastic image: they secularized their appearances by growing their hair and giving up their vegetarian diet. They were convinced that renunciation (*chujia*出家) should not be understood as turning away from society, but rather as entering into society and working for the liberation of the whole of humanity. In 1950, for example, under the
powerful persuasion of the Canton Women’s Democratic Federation, a group of nuns in Guangzhou "were awakened as if they woke up from a long dream." They attended group meetings to voice their tragic experiences of the past. Some of them readily renounced their monastic vows and returned to lay lives, going into factories as workers (Xianggang fojiao lianhehui, 1976: 112).

**Buddhist Justification for Socialist Transformation**

Progressive Buddhists pushed hard for the sangha to undergo socialist transformation, claiming that such transformation in fact was beneficial for Buddhism. But they could not call openly for abandoning Buddhist doctrines, disciplines, and traditional practices altogether. Some sorts of justification through reinterpreting Buddhist doctrine were needed to convince ordinary Buddhists.

While the nationwide land reform was still under way, a new campaign for cooperatives (hezuoshe 合作社) quickly spread all over Communist China, and monks and nuns were requested to break with their traditional system of monastic community and form cooperative groups with local peasants. Obviously, this campaign would eventually disintegrate the sangha, yet progressive Buddhists justified it by reinterpreting Buddhist ideas such as unity and harmony, and by claiming that the members of the sangha should in fact lead cooperative lives. Monks and nuns, as they argued, were supposed to give up everything except minimal necessities of everyday living and their new communal lives. By the nature of worldly renunciation, their religious practice was aimed at eliminating selfish views and self-attachment. Therefore, the campaign for cooperatives helped the sangha to regain its original strength of practice by liberating monks and nuns from feudal bondage so that they could live a pure religious life as expected by the Buddha (Xiandai foxue 1951, 1, 10: 29). (21) It can be argued that this kind of justification was rather one-sided: it ignored the essential purpose of monastic life, which supposedly provided the optimal environment for spiritual practice, while the campaign for cooperatives was aimed at merely transforming monks and nuns into productive laborers and remodeling them into good citizens of the
For progressive Buddhists, doctrinal reinterpretation was aimed at matching Buddhism with Marxism. Such matching was refrained by Communists, who were afraid that it might have a negative effect on the position of the Marxist ideology in new China, because it would be taken as a confirmation of Buddhist beliefs. Communists were therefore rather reluctant to make similar comparisons and dissuaded religious followers from expanding on the parallels between the two. However, progressive Buddhists felt obliged to demonstrate that Buddhist doctrines and practices did not contradict Marxism, although the two should never be understood as the same, and that the two could co-exist in new China even though Buddhism should submit to the leadership of Communism. Some of them suggested that all of the Buddha’s teachings were compatible with that of Marxism, any Buddhist doctrine and practice contradictory to Marxism could be suspected of being a latter-day adulteration of Buddhism due to feudalist and superstitious influences, and therefore must be gotten rid of so that the true teachings of the Buddha would prevail. Repayment of kindness and compassionate killing based on patriotism are the two most popular concepts often used by progressive Buddhists to justify Buddhist loyalty to the nation and participation in the Korean War, which occurred in 1950.

Patriotism was one of the most inspiring ideas that deeply influenced Chinese people’s thinking and regulated their action in modern history. And it was given a new meaning after the founding of the People’s Republic of China where the Communist Party, the People’s government, and the nation-state formed a trinity of China’s political system (Li Peizhao, 2001: 22–24). Within the framework of patriotism heavily oriented towards the nation-state, one’s love for the nation was to be the same as his love for the Party. In other words, one who loves the Chinese people should also love the Party, support the government, and protect the nation. Patriotism thus called for unconditional surrendering to the Communist leadership, for serving the people, and for defending national sovereignty and territory against invasion. Patriotic spirit had penetrated all political campaigns since 1950, and culminated in the
"Resist America and Aid Korea" Movement, which brought socialist transformation to new heights.

Although the meaning and practice of modern patriotism cannot be directly found in Buddhist texts, they may be construed through reinterpretation of Buddhist doctrines, such as repaying kindness, subduing the devil, and practicing compassion. In the article "On Buddhist Patriotism," Juzan cited a number of passages from Buddhist texts that record how the Buddha and eminent monks in the past had encouraged Buddhists to take military actions against invaders. Thus it was perfectly necessary for Buddhists in new China to participate in the war of resisting the American invasion (Juzan, 1951: 5). In the article "Love for the Motherland," Juzan first sang the praises of the achievements of the nation under the auspices of the Communist Party, and then criticized those Buddhists who wanted to prioritize religion over socialism. According to him, Buddhists would not be able to practice their religion without depending on the society in which they lived. He also insisted that their religious pursuit must not be divorced from contemporary social reality. In socialist China, he continued to argue, monks and nuns simply could not practice Bodhisattva’s path of serving people and saving the world unless they embraced patriotism. For Chinese Buddhists, loving one’s motherland is the supreme virtue. The enemies of the nation are also the enemies of Buddhism, he emphasized, and there is no Buddhist political position separate from the interests of the nation and the people. Patriotism thus became a powerful force demanding the unity and uniformity of Buddhists and other Chinese under the leadership of the Communist Party. Any suggestion that Buddhists should love their religion first would in fact be harmful to the very existence of Buddhism. In addition, Buddhists are members of the family of the Chinese nation and thus must stand firmly by the people’s side (Juzan, 1953: 6).

Under the leadership of Juzan and other progressive Buddhists, or rather inspired by contemporary patriotic spirit, Buddhists in Beijing organized the Committee on the "Resist America and Aid Korea movement" for Buddhist Circles in 1951. Similar organizations were gradually set up in big cities throughout China. Monks and
nuns took to the streets to demonstrate their hatred of American imperialists and love for the Chinese nation and people, and their support for the government’s efforts in the Korean War. Many young monks and nuns, having changed their robes for military uniforms, marched to the war front in Korea as voluntary soldiers. Could these actions be justified by Buddhist doctrine and tradition? Obviously, they transgressed both the Buddhist discipline of non-killing and the doctrine of compassion without hatred, yet Juzan affirmed and encouraged such activities. The idea that monks and nuns should love their fellow Chinese, as he claimed, is rather confirmed in the Buddhist doctrine of compassion and repayment of kindness. They should try their best to fulfill the wishes of the people, for only then could they attain enlightenment. Juzan cited a well-known passage from the *Avatamsaka Sutra:*

> To satisfy all living beings is the same as to satisfy the Tathagata. To respect all living beings is the same as to respect the Tathagata. To make all living beings happy is the same as to make the Tathagata happy. Why? Because great compassion is the essence of the Tathagata...Because of great compassion, the bodhi-mind arises and one may attain perfect enlightenment. This can be illustrated by the metaphor of a great king-tree in the desert. Its branches, leaves, and fruit will be abundant if its roots get water. It is the same with the king-tree of bodhi in the desert of life and death: all living creatures are the roots of the tree, and all Buddhas and bodhisattvas are flowers and fruits. By nourishing living creatures with the water of the great compassion, one can obtain flowers and fruits of wisdom of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas. (Juzan, 1953a: 4–5)

Juzan interpreted "all living creatures" (*zhongsheng* 众生) as "the people" (*renmin* 人民), identifying the service to them with the worship of the Buddha. Thus Buddhists who love and serve the people are actually practicing the way to attaining the supreme enlightenment. Nevertheless, "the people" do not include those who oppose the Party and the government, for they are counterrevolutionaries and the enemies of "the people." Instead of
loving them, Buddhists should demonstrate their hatred for these enemies and strive to remove them from society. Juzan must have known the meaning of "all living beings" in Buddhism is much broader than the category of "the people", and he was certainly aware that living beings, at least all human beings, should be treated equally in the Buddhist tradition. Why, then, did he insist that Chinese Buddhists should be kind and compassionate to the people only? In anticipating this question, Juzan articulated a dilemma that if all living creatures were treated equally, then it was nondiscrimination between friends and enemies. But this would be a violation of the principle of "granting wishes to living beings" if Buddhists loved the enemies of the people, because the people’s wish was to destroy all enemies.

Could Buddhists love all people equally? Juzan’s reply was no. He cited Chairman Mao to argue that no one could actually love all living beings without discrimination. Mao once said in Yan’an, the revolutionary headquarters, that it was impossible for one to love one’s enemy in a class society. Love is a conceptual product of social practices. Since human society is divided into different classes, there cannot be universal love—love for all human beings. While the ruling class in feudal society advocated such love and many so-called sages and saints in the past promoted it, Mao pointed out, no one could actually practice it due to its impracticable nature. Mao then continued: "Love for all human beings (renlei zhi ai 人類之愛) may be possible. But it will be possible only after the elimination of class division in the whole world. A class-based society divides people into opposite groups. Only when classes disappear will love for all human beings emerge. But it cannot be so now. [Thus] we cannot love our enemies, nor can we love those evil phenomena of society. Our goal is to destroy them" (Juzan, 1953a: 5). (22)

Juzan made use of Mao’s reasoning to demonstrate that Buddhists should wake up from the illusion of loving the enemy, and join the Chinese people in the nation’s struggle against common enemies without showing mercy. Loving-kindness and compassion epitomized by bodhisattvas such as Avalokitesvara in the Lotus
Sutra are simply ideals that reflect the undeniable and perpetual reality of human suffering and needs for help. They are aimed at inspiring humans to work for others and liberating them from suffering. They certainly could not and should not be practiced in this world of class struggle. Apparently, Juzan drew more on the words of Mao than those of the Buddha recorded in Buddhist scriptures, making use of the former to disprove the latter. One may not be surprised then to see that in following the teachings of Maoism, Juzan passionately appealed to Buddhists to fulfill the duties assigned by the government headed by Mao, even when such duties contradicted Buddhist doctrines and practices. An example is the debate over whether Buddhists, especially monks and nuns, should make contributions to warfare or even take part in combat on the war front. Traditionally, any kind of killing, especially the killing of human beings, was prohibited by both the doctrine of compassion and the discipline of non-killing; yet, according to the Communist view and Mao, struggle against or even the killing of counterrevolutionaries and foreign imperialists is absolutely necessary and inevitable. The government thus called upon the Chinese people, including Buddhists, to attack counterrevolutionaries and kill American invaders and their Korean "dogs."

In following Communist ideology and in responding to the government’s call for support of the war effort, Juzan felt obliged to reinterpret Buddhist doctrines so that a theoretical foundation could be laid down for monks and nuns to undertake a dramatic transformation from non-killing to killing. In December 1950, when a reader of Modern Buddhist Studies inquired as to what attitude Buddhists should have towards the Korean War, Juzan responded: "According to Buddhist doctrine, providing happiness [for others] means loving-kindness, and eliminating suffering [of others] means compassion. Any methods and action aimed at loving-kindness and compassion are called skillful means. Now, because of the American invasion, Korean people suffer so much that they feel as if they were living in deep water and burning fire. We the Buddhists, whose guiding principles are loving-kindness and compassion, are
duty-bound to liberate them from suffering. As methods are needed for delivering one from suffering, assisting Korea is our skillful means and the important task we the Buddhist must perform now” (Xiandai foxue 1951, 1, 10: 29). (23)

Loving-kindness and compassion are so important in Mahayana Buddhism that one who aspires after enlightenment must practice them. In the Buddhist tradition, when necessary, one can, for the sake of compassion and loving kindness, depart from the precept of non-killing. In other words, the precept of non-killing can be and shall be replaced by the idea of compassionate killing. In an effort to convince others that the precept of non-killing could be discarded if killing promised to save and protect more people’s lives, Juzan made use of the Yogacarabhumisastra (Yujia shidi lun瑜伽師地論) to advocate compassion killing. (24) Since American imperialists were destroying world peace and threatening many people’s lives, Buddhists should take the action of compassionate killing just as Sakyamuni Buddha did before to subdue the troops of Mara. Juzan stated:

Resisting America is not different from subduing Mara, and this is what we Buddhists must do wholeheartedly. Meanwhile, we should also know that resisting America is the same as aiding Korea. The Korean people will not be able to enjoy peace and happiness unless American imperialists are expelled from Korea or buried under the earth. Resisting America is thus the expedient means [to save the people], and aiding Korea is the manifestation of loving kindness and compassion. (Juzan 1951, 5)

Should Buddhists extend compassion equally to all without discriminating between friends and enemies? And should they show mercy and tolerance to American as well? Juzan made it clear that neither mercy nor tolerance should be extended to the Americans simply because they were enemies of the people and invaders of the friends’ country. Tolerance in Buddhism means calmness in the face of danger, and Buddhists should be wise enough to distinguish what cannot be tolerated from what should be tolerated. Buddhists cannot
tolerate the American invasion, which created unendurable suffering for the Korean people.

Yiliang 一量, one of the progressive monks in charge of Buddhist activities in Hanzhou, made use of twofold truth in Buddhism to confirm the gaps between the theory of equality and actual practice. The idea of equality is spoken from the transcendent truth of emptiness, different from secular egalitarianism (pingjun zhiyi 平均主義). It is not meant to deal with people’s lives or this real world. Although the Buddha considers all living beings equal on the basis of great compassion, he employs different means to deal with people of different natures and actual situations. Accordingly, Buddhists in China should practice patriotism and distinguish the enemies from the people, demonstrating their hatred for the American imperialists and compassion toward the Korean people (Yiliang, 1951: 7). (25)

The idea of compassionate killing cannot be dismissed easily, for it does have a textual basis. But obviously the idea itself is not intended for ordinary Buddhists as, according to Buddhist texts, compassionate killing can only be practiced by advanced bodhisattvas. It is impossible for us to determine whether progressive Buddhists were unaware of the "spiritual qualifications" for compassionate killing, or whether they distorted the texts intentionally for political reasons. It is evident, however, that they reinterpreted compassionate killing so as to grant some sort of faith-based legitimacy to the Korean War. To be sure, what remains puzzling is why Juzan and like-minded Buddhists invoked the idea of compassionate killing to legitimize the Korean War if they did not object to the Communist/Maoist view that enemies were by no means friends and could therefore be killed. It is likely, I would hazard a guess, that these progressive Buddhists wanted to show the sangha’s support for the state when the Communist leadership apparently demanded Chinese people to take part in ethical killing. It is out of the scope of this paper to examine further whether progressive Buddhists fairly and accurately interpreted Buddhism, yet we may keep in mind that the standards and guidelines for distinguishing friends from enemies were set up by the Party based on the theory of class struggle. Progressive Buddhists’ new
interpretation of compassionate killing was intended to help free some Buddhists from the possible burn of guilt that came from their participation in violence sanctioned by the new socialist state. (26)

Conclusion

The socialist transformation of Buddhism in the early People’s Republic of China was effective and widespread. Progressive Buddhists in Beijing and other areas played a leading role in this process not only through their reinterpretation of Buddhism and proposals, but also through their own actions. In April 1950, Juzan pioneered a gunnysack factory in Beijing, and he and many other monks and nuns in the area worked as managers and ordinary laborers in the factory (Juzan, 1951a: 33). The proposals and activities of Juzan and others in Beijing became paradigms for monks and nuns nationwide to follow. For instance, on January 20, 1950, Buddhist leaders in Hanzhou set up the Preparatory Committee for the Buddhist Association of Hanzhou under the supervision of the newly established municipal government. The committee consisted of several abbots of temples in the area, and Ven. Yuetao 月濤, the abbot of the Xia Tianzhu Monastery, served as the director. The mission of the committee was to re-educate monks and nuns so that they would transform themselves ideologically, embrace socialism willingly, promote patriotic activities among local Buddhists enthusiastically, and fight feudalism and capitalism resolutely (Lengxiao, 1995: 49–51).

Within a short period, more than two hundred young Buddhist monks and nuns abandoned their monastic vows and returned to lay lives. During the Movement of Suppressing Counterrevolutionaries (1950–1951), the same committee organized a number of campaigns to search for disguised counterrevolutionaries within the sangha. Thirty-six monastics, including one nun, were identified as the enemies of the people, and most of them were arrested and put in jail. In response to the Land Reform Movement, monks and nuns in Hanzhou returned their temple lands to the government and let the government reorganize them as cooperative teams. When the Korean War broke out, more than 1,300 monks and nuns signed a "Patriotic Pledge of Monks and Nuns" in support of China’s war
effort. And abbots of the temples encouraged young monks and nuns to go to the war front for their country. Similar phenomena could also be seen in other cities, such as Shanghai, Wuhan, and Changsha (Xu & Wang, 2002: 177–83).

Many causes and conditions, both internal and external, could be identified as factors conducive to the socialist transformation of institutional Buddhism in the early 1950s. From the outside, the Marxist attitude toward religion, the Communist state’s policy on the freedom of religious belief, and its political campaigns one after the other helped forge a hostile environment for Buddhism. From the inside, monks and nuns found it hard to resist the criticisms—such as moral corruption, ignorance, indolence, and suspicious possession of huge tracts of unused land—hurled at their groups. All these forced the sangha to accept the reality and undergo changes, even though it was sometimes even harder for them to suddenly abandon monastic tradition and follow the socialist transformation closely. Such transformation of the modern Chinese sangha would not have taken place effectively and successfully if the progressive Buddhists had not spared any pain to push for it.

It may be difficult for many readers to understand why progressive Buddhists went out their way to support Communism. Was it because they saw the inevitability of change? Were they truly convinced by the Marxist ideology? Or did they consider their activities as upaya (skillful means), which would allow them to save the sangha from total extinction? Perhaps it would not do them justice to criticize them for their complicity with the Communist regime. (27) Nor would it be fair to brush aside the fact that progressive Buddhists operated at a time when many Chinese citizens were enchanted by the prospects of socialism. The context of the 1950s to some extent explains why "non-progressive" Buddhists did not put up much resistance to their progressive colleagues’ rhetoric and state policies. During those days, Chinese people in general sincerely or even fanatically believed that Chairman Mao was the savior of the Chinese nation and the Communist Party would certainly lead them to a much better life in future. It may not be an exaggeration to say that Communism was at
that time regarded as the supreme religion of China. Supported by political power and administrative authority, Communism demanded exclusive faith from all the Chinese people. (28)

Against this backdrop all religions, including Buddhism, simply could not compete with state ideology for influence and prestige. This historical context means that the majority of monastics, who did not belong to the group of progressive Buddhists, were forced to cope with a most trying situation. They were in a vulnerable position amid the rise of a socialist regime that was popular among the Chinese people. They did not have sufficient political resources to resist the advance of the supreme religion of the Communist regime. In addition, because of the problems of the sangha, which they themselves could not deny, they became easy targets for hostile outsiders like anti-Buddhist cadres, and they knew this quite well.

Xu Yun 虛雲 (?—1959), one of the preeminent clerics in modern China, is a good example. Based in the Yunju Mountain in the 1950s, he explained in detail the monastery’s budget to his disciples lest the government was critical of his leadership. In the wake of the Korean War, Xu Yun told his disciples to anticipate the possibility of military duties. Unlike progressive Buddhists, he did not show active support for the socialist government. Instead, he implored his disciples to continue their religious pursuit, since "monks" and "soldiers" were mere physical forms empty in nature. While this can be interpreted as his subtle resistance to the state, which did not like religion, the fact that this venerable monk told others to endure spoke volumes: he thought it necessary to not go against the new regime in public (Xu Yun, [1955] 1998: 147–50). In the early 1950s, the warnings of progressive Buddhists that disobedience would lead to the demise of Buddhism were not to be taken lightly. To say the least, these warnings, together with the momentous social-political changes launched by the CCP, created a post-1949 Buddhist milieu where many Buddhists saw the possible peril of their religion, regardless of what they thought of their progressive co-religionists’ political stand. Both progressive and non-progressve Buddhists naturally wanted to keep at bay the tragic destiny that befell counterrevolutionaries and heterodox Daoist sects, and for this they
cannot be blamed.

Notes

1. In the 1960s and 1970s, in addition to Holmes Welch, a few others, including both insiders and outsiders, produced works on Buddhism in the Communist regime (see Zhao, 1957; Amritananda, 1961; Hsu, 1964; Benz, 1965; Yang, 1965; Bush, 1970). The relationship between the state and Buddhism has drawn more attention in the past few years. But the 1950s has remained a relatively under-explored period (see Ashiwa, 2009; Brook, 2009).

2. In both the pre-1949 and post-1949 periods, the word "progressive" (jinbu 進步) was and has been in common use. It refers to individuals who were/are for radical change, the notion of progress, and modernization. These people might be Communists and socialists (some died before the founding of the CCP in 1921), but most had/have a pro-socialist slant, if they were not socialist/Communist radicals. "Progressive Buddhist" (Jinbu di fójiao jié rénshē 进步的佛教界人士) refers to Buddhists who were/are sympathetic to change, the notion of progress, and modernization. It may not be very easy to identify the number of progressive Buddhists at any time in modern and contemporary China, since Buddhists shifted their cultural and political positions quite a bit. For instance, some monks and nuns who became more receptive to socialism after receiving political education in the early 1950s could be regarded as entering the progressive Buddhist circle. As for Juzan, he had been a progressive Buddhist since the early 1930s.

3. The present study does not cover Buddhism in other regions. By Chinese sangha, it means institutional Buddhism, basically monastic organizations of monks and nuns in the areas where the Chinese people (Han nationality, Hanzu 漢族) live. Therefore, the terms "(Chinese) sangha" and "institutional Buddhism" in this article are
sometimes interchangeable.


5. In all these articles, Wanjun (萬均), one of Juzan’s pen names, is used as the name of the author.

6. Most scholars in the past, such as Holmes Welch, translated this term as "Modern Buddhism," but I think that "Modern Buddhist Studies" would be a better translation. The new translation conveys better the meaning of the title. In addition, it should be noted that in the political atmosphere of the early 1950s, religion was a very sensitive topic. It could be compared to the late 1920s, when the Nationalist government did not permit terms such as "Buddhism" in Buddhist organizations. It seems likely that Juzan and others were concerned about whether the new government would allow the use of the term "Buddhism" (fojiao 佛教). Therefore, I prefer "Modern Buddhist Studies" over "Buddhism."

7. Chen Mingshu joined the 1911 revolution and became interested in Buddhism in the early Republican period. Mingzhen was Juzan’s friend, and supported Communist reform. His articles in support of land reform were also published in Modern Buddhist Studies. Liang Sicheng, the son of Liang Qichao, was a famous architect in China. Li Jishen was a statesman in the Nationalist state. Sherab Gyatso was a highly esteemed Tibetan monk in the early Communist regime.

8. This is part of the announcement to set up the Publication House of Xiandai foxue jointly signed by nineteen Buddhist leaders with Juzan at the lead.

9. Juzan’s reply is given in the Q and A section of Xiandai foxue.

10. This is quoted from a long reply given by Juzan to the question as to whether Buddhists should request the government to set up clear policy on religious belief.
11. *Taisho Tripitaka*, vol. 3 (159), 297c. The ten virtues are: cultivation of wisdom that may illuminate the world, beautifying the state through virtue and wisdom, providing people with happiness, subduing the enemies, leaving behind worries and fear, inviting virtuous persons to discuss state matters, setting up the Dharma as a foundation for people to live in peace, protecting the human world with the Dharma of heavenly kings, being a master of actions, and being the master of all people.

12. Juzan’s reply is quoted from the Q and A section in *Xiandai foxue*.

13. This is part of Juzan’s reply to the question of what is the relation between the Buddhist practice of giving and the land reform.

14. Information about the title is not available.

15. Information about the title of this piece is not available.

16. The reply was given in the Q and A section.

17. On October 6, 1950, Chen Qiyuan, a vice minister of Internal Affairs, told a Buddhist audience: "On average two persons occupy one temple. In comparison, government employees are packed in their offices, it seems rather unfair. But if we need to borrow monasteries and temples in future, we should do so after consultation …. Otherwise, people will not be happy when the temples are unoccupied." See *Xiandai fojiao* 1950, 1, 3: 6. Information about the title of this piece from *Xiandai foxue* is not available.

18. Information about the title of this source is not available.

19. Heterodox Daoist sects (會道門 *Huidaomen*) were barracked by the government. Several articles on the issue appeared in *Xiandai foxue*. For instance, 1951, 1, 6: 3–24. For this piece, information about author and/or title is not available.

20. Information about the title of this piece from *Xiandai foxue* is
21. These are the contents of a reply by the editor of *Xiandai foxue* to the question of how monks and nuns should undergo the reform program.

22. Mao’s statement was from the talks at the Yan’an Forum on literature and art (Mao, 1942).

23. The reply was given in the Q and A section.

24. *Taisho Tripitaka* 30, 5171b. Juzan here is referring to the record that the Buddha as the Bodhisattva in his previous life killed one person in order to save more merchants. Compassionate killing and killing one to save more were also advocated during the Second World War by both Chinese and Japanese Buddhists. See Xue Yu 2005: 43-76.

25. The new interpretations of killing and non-tolerance toward enemies can also be seen in the political campaign against counterrevolutionaries and heterodox Daoist sects (Welch 1972, 272–288).

26. In Jianyang County of Siquan province, a nun who maintained a vegetarian diet was expelled from the local Women’s Association (*Xiandai foxue* 1951, 1, 5: 8). In addition, local cadres in Changsha forced monks and nuns to abandon their Buddhist robes and wear secular clothes such as the Zhongshan suit (*Xiandai foxue* 1951, 1, 7: 27). For these two sources, information about the author is not available.

27. In my view, like Tanxu’s activities during wartime, which are analyzed in the paper by James Carter, Juzan’s activities were also very ambiguous, in the sense that they should not be conceptualized in a straightforward manner as collaboration or complicity.

28. For a discussion on Maoism as a religious movement, see Yu, 1975.
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