An Introduction to Bad Buddhism

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From the pop star status of the Dalai Lama to the global promotion of mindfulness for wellness and corporate productivity, Buddhism and Buddhists are the recipient of overwhelmingly positive images of peace, simplicity, and kindness across a wide swathe of transnational popular culture. Romantic images of Buddhism as inherently good or moral, and concomitantly, condemnations of deviant actors, are not just projections of public commentators or even some scholars but are also generated and debated by communities throughout the Buddhist world. However, this brand has particularly taken root in the West, where Buddhism is judged if not an entirely positive phenomenon, for religious and non-religious folks alike, then at least a harmless influence (see Borup 2016; Tweed 2008; Wilson 2014).

Recent events have cracked this façade, and more than ever, scholars and practitioners alike are asked to contend with a global popular discourse of Buddhists behaving badly. This Special Focus engages with this phenomenon, which we call “Bad Buddhism.” We define this term as Buddhist beliefs, traditions, and practices that challenge normative interpretations, unsettle, or even disgust the observer, and appear to degrade or distract from so-called “authentic” or “pure” Buddhism. On occasion, Buddhists’ transgressions against their good name appear relatively minor and their condemnation contested. For example, in 2019, parts of Twitterverse declared the Dalai Lama “cancelled” after his sexist comments about the necessity for any future female reincarnation of himself to be physically attractive in order be taken seriously (Salam 2019). At least for some, the fact that even the Dalai Lama might demand rebuke appeared symbolic of a new age of engaged, critical politics in which heroic figures rarely survive continued scrutiny.

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1 In contemporary popular usage, the term “cancelled” means to reject entirely or henceforth ignore an idea or person due to their misconduct.
Figure 1: BuzzFeed reporter Julia Reinstein’s retweet of a BBC news interview between Rajini Vaidyanathan and the Dalai Lama, with the commentary, “I most certainly did not have ‘the dalai lama gets cancelled’ on my 2019 bingo card.”

Other events are of an entirely different, and more troubling, magnitude.

A series of accusations of sexual assault and misconduct have racked Buddhist communities worldwide. Most prominently, a number of Buddhist teachers operating in the West have been accused and condemned for sexual abuse or sexual misconduct with their followers, including, but not limited to, Sogyal Rinpoche (Rigpa), Sakyong Mipham Rinpoche (Shambhala International), Lama Surya Das (Dzogchen Foundation), Joshu Sasaki (Rinzai-ji), and Eido Shimano Roshi (Zen

In the wake of the international #MeToo movement, these incidents have circulated not only within Buddhist publications like *Tricycle*, but also within mainstream news outlets such as *The New York Times*, undercutting the assumed morality of even the most renowned “Buddhist Masters.” Through these cases, a life-long commitment to Buddhism is shown to be insufficient inoculation against the machinations of patriarchal power and violence; indeed, it might even make one more susceptible to these forces.

Sometimes, Bad Buddhism extends to the level of the most heinous crimes. In May of 2015, three Nobel laureates called the Myanmar government’s treatment of the Rohingya in Rakhine state, “nothing less than genocide” (The Guardian 2015). Today, more than 800,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled Rakhine State for the safety of Bangladesh following a series of attacks launched at the Myanmar military’s Border Guard Police by a militant group called the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (International Crisis Group 2016). The Myanmar military responded with extraordinary violence, razing villages to the ground, carrying out summary executions, and using rape as a weapon of war (United Nations Human Rights Council 2018). The military stands credibly accused of crimes against humanity; the civilian government, helmed by once-beloved Buddhist democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, is accused of inaction or even wanton disregard for the Rohingya people’s suffering (Ware and Laoutides 2018).

Journalists and human rights activists writing about the crisis in Myanmar have often extended valid criticisms of the military apparatus to the broader populous on the basis of their shared religion. The public role Buddhist monks have played in propagating anti-Muslim discourse has contributed to its spectacle in a very visceral register that draws far greater international attention to this particular conflict than to various others that have raged across Myanmar’s border lands for decades (Asia Foundation 2017). The saffron robes and beatific face of monk U Wirathu, who self-styles as the “Buddhist Bin Laden,” on the cover of *Time Magazine* came to represent, for many observers, a troubling cloud of violence settling over Burmese Buddhism (Time 2013).

The Rohingya crisis reveals long-standing limitations in both pop scholarship and academia as it pertains to the treatment of Bad Buddhism. In particular, the tendency to view the anti-Muslim discourse of Buddhist revivalist groups like မဘသ [Ma Ba Tha] in Myanmar or *Bodu Bala Sena* in Sri Lanka as political power brokers masked in the legitimizing language of religion produces troubling analytical blind spots. It reveals ingrained scholarly discontent with engaging with Buddhism itself as political, nationalist, or violent. Understanding the ways in which select groups of Buddhists arrive at a moral justification for the mistreatment of minority communities is essential to addressing the structural violence to which such communities are subject. To explore the moral landscapes in which religious commitments to non-violence can be minimized, circumvented, or even abrogated entirely requires genuine and sustained engagement with canon, but also with Buddhism as it is lived in complex topographies of history, society, and international information flows in the new-media age.

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7 This is a common abbreviation for the group မယ္သော်စစ္ဆိုးအမွေအနားဆောင်ရွက်ချက်သိန်း (မမျိုးသော်စစ္ဆိုးအမွေအနားဆောင်ရွက်ချက်သိန်း) or “The Committee for the Protection of Race/Nation and Religion.”
This conviction is one of the key motivations behind this Special Focus and our research agendas more broadly. In her work, Melyn McKay grapples with the moral worlds of Myanmar Buddhist women engaged in the Ma Ba Tha movement, both lay and ordained, and has found that risk discourse offers a medium through which female members emplaced values into networks of meaning in ways that were socially and ethically transformative. Hannah Gould selected a very different context for her doctoral fieldwork, examining the work of domestic Buddhist altar companies in contemporary Japan. But she encountered similarly fierce debates about what Buddhism is and should be, debates that were subtly tied up in transnational exchanges of raw materials, cosmopolitan design trends, and Buddhism’s global brand.

Buddhist altars or butsudan have been central sites for ancestor veneration and Buddhist practice in Japanese homes for several generations and the contemporary butsudan market is worth many billions of yen per annum. However, widespread demographic changes in Japan have slowly dismantled the intergenerational relations of care via which people tend to their dead, pitching the butsudan tradition and industry into a state of crisis. Butsudan companies have responded with slick marketing campaigns, glittery showrooms, and flashy new designs (Nelson 2013). Positioned as a debased form of “funerary Buddhism” (葬式仏教 [Sōshiki Bukkyō]) that is disinterested with people’s everyday lives (Tamamuro 1963), the activities of this industry are regularly marred by accusations of profiteering in the form of forcing unnecessary extravagances upon the bereaved (see Ukai 2018; Covell 2009). Beyond Japan, the confluence of religious and commercial interests is one of the greatest flashpoints for moralising discourses around Buddhism, with popular condemnations of monastics’ accumulation of wealth and its apparent inconsistency with Buddhist teachings (e.g., in Thailand, see Head 2017).

However, for people working in funeral parlours and butsudan stores, retail is understood as equally a practice of commerce and care (Gould 2019). Butsudan workers are acutely aware of the tensions within which their industry operates and seek to shield themselves from critique through public displays of piety and appeals to a transnational Buddhist identity. Nearly 80% of butsudan currently sold in Japan are manufactured offshore. Over time, this change has devastated the domestic craft industry and artisan tradition but allowed larger companies to increase their profit margins and stay afloat. In an effort to guarantee the quality of foreign-made altars, one of Japan’s largest butsudan companies, Hasegawa, makes appeals to the Buddhist piety of its Burmese factory workers, suggesting that their craft work is suitably devotional. More recently, a butsudan store in Osaka posted to social media that “Buddhism is the only religion that has spread peacefully, rather than by war” and is thus worthy of preservation in today’s Japan. When Gould raised the subject of the Rohingya crisis with the store’s workers, they evaded the topic, or disavowed its relevance to Japanese Buddhism. Artful operations in the global social media space mean drawing on the global currency of Buddhism’s good name, but also carefully dodging those “bad Buddhists” who can embarrass the corporate brand.
Monsters of our own making

In this manner, despite working in distinct locales and grappling with seemingly unrelated theoretical concerns, from the earliest stages of our research projects and academic careers, the editors of this Special Focus have found ourselves confronting normative ideals about what Buddhism is and should be. Such ideals circulate within our field sites and scholarly communities, and they position certain regions, communities, and (dare we say) scholars as somehow deviant and/or lacking; if the Buddhist community that McKay was studying was “too political” or “too violent,” then the Buddhist community that Gould was working with were “too materialistic,” and as such, neither of us appeared to be legitimate “Buddhist scholars.” We thus found ourselves writing ethnographies of “Bad Buddhism” and “Bad Buddhists.” Moreover, as relatively junior, female scholars entering an international, interdisciplinary scholastic community, we found that unspoken rules defining what is or is not deemed “real” or “good” Buddhism create a daunting, if not at times hostile, academic environment.

There are multiple threads to the knot of valuations that form Good/Bad Buddhism that need to be pulled, many of which extend far beyond the scope of this Introduction. Our Special Focus follows in the footsteps of previous interventions in the field, from social scientists and religious scholars, who have interrogated these norms and the taken-for-granted authority vested in select individuals and institutions in defining and maintaining them. For example, anthropologists have asked, and repeatedly re-asked, the question, “what is the anthropology of Buddhism about?” (Gellner 1990, 2017). Although in 2017, David Gellner stated that, “it is no longer necessary for the anthropology of Buddhism to be overwhelmingly concerned with the authenticity and identity of its subjects” (203), we suggest that the current moment demands us, as scholars and global citizens, to speak directly to this issue. The question of who defines Buddhism, the international channels through which these designations circulate, and whose definitions are silenced or become doctrine speaks to deeper, structural questions of power.

Crucially, we want to suggest that models of Good/Bad Buddhism are both produced by and grounded in a tradition of Good/Bad Buddhist scholarship. This goes beyond a discursive entanglement of scholarship and its subject. For instance, the lines between the practice of faith and scholarship are often blurred, such that for some at least, good scholarship bleeds into a project of being a good Buddhist, or a moral being (e.g., Ng 2016). Further, many Buddhist communities being studied are increasingly referring to and speaking back to scholarship, in ways that can both alarm and delight (see Gleig 2019). For those wishing to defend an “academic ideal of objectivity” (Reader 2008), these increasingly indefinite borders and a renewed commitment to activist or ethical scholarship can threaten or offend (see varied scholarly positions expressed in the 2008 “Blurred Genres” Special Focus in the Journal of Global Buddhism, edited by Rocha & Baumann). For the authors of the present Special Focus, the idea of an objective scholarship is both quixotic and obfuscatory, in that it belies the particular structural conditions that determine exactly what that scholarship should be and who can practice it.

The backbone of normative constructions of Buddhism, particularly those circulated in Western popular media and scholarship, is textual sources. There are certainly many advantages to
this foundation. Quite simply, a textual basis sets up a convenient test for journalists, policy makers, and scholars to check if something is Buddhist: does it exist in Buddhist writings, or better yet, the Pali Canon? A bias toward texts as the shibboleth of religiosity has been critiqued by a focus on practice within studies of “lived religion” (e.g., McGuire 2008; Orsi 2013) and on materiality within studies of “material religion” (e.g., Morgan 2010; Meyer et al. 2011). The pre-eminence of text is also bound up in the making of Buddhist modernism(s) (McMahan 2009), which strips Buddhism of many of its so-called “cultural” and ritual elements, to produce an apparently universal “philosophy” that is in fact located in very particular identities of race, gender, and class. Not arbitrarily, we suspect, textual sources also happen to be what is most convenient as research materials for scholars working within the institutional framework of the contemporary Western university. Texts are (usually) portable and purchasable and thus help one to overcome constraints on research funds, time, and negotiated access.

Texts (as discourse and material object) are often important within Buddhist communities and the definitions of Buddhism that emerge there. However, the key texts we have encountered in our field sites—glossy advertising catalogues extolling the virtues of new butsudan and treatise produced by monastic printing presses on the duty to “buy Buddhist”—appear far removed from those enshrined in the “canon,” either that of Buddhism or Buddhist studies (Freiberger 2004). In these canons, certain texts, languages, and kinds of authors are privileged over others. In his 1990s thesis, Traditions of Buddhist Practice in Burma, Gustaaf Houtman warns against scholars falling into the “Pali Trap” or the unquestioned assumption that phenomena in Buddhist lives can be traced back to a set of Pali concepts that have universal meanings even across vernaculars, as seen in prominent works on Buddhism in Thailand and Burma (e.g., Tambiah 1975; Spiro 1982). Houtman further argues that anthropologists’ treatment of Pali loanwords is “symptomatic of their textual orientation” that arises when “unfamiliarity with context has been sacrificed for familiarity with text” (1990: 253). In short, a textual orientation functions as a misdirect from insufficient engagement with Buddhism on the ground. Within an academic world system, language issues also speak to deeper structural inequalities about what kinds of people are deemed able to produce theory and what kinds of people simply furnish case studies (Kuwayama 2004; Yamashita et al. 2004).

Ground-breaking work by feminist Buddhist scholars incisively critiques patriarchal structures of knowledge production within Buddhist communities and those who write about them. Liz Wilson, for example, notes how the prioritizing of certain texts first led to nineteenth-century Western scholarship’s romantic image of Buddhism as rational, individual, and gender egalitarian—a characterisation that has been subsequently roundly critiqued (2012: 259-60). Most importantly, scholars today must recognise how different forms of privilege and silencing intersect in our scholarly practice. To give one example, with Asian Buddhist women potentially silenced by, and pushing back against, Eurocentric feminist critiques (e.g., Kawahashi 2003; Suh 2004; Langenburg 2018).

If texts are one great authority for scholarly and popular definitions of Buddhism, then ordained (male) monastics are the other. Many of the contributors to this Special Focus contest this hierarchy of authority, by centering the views of women, lay people, commercial actors, and even non-humans. The tendency within Buddhist studies to research monastics can reflect genuine...
methodological challenges in the form of limitations to access and unfamiliarity with the field site; monastics appear as the easily identifiable, contactable community of “Buddhists.” However, we contend that it also speaks to a desire to study as close as possible to what is imagined to be the “source” of religious knowledge. This privileging of ordained, (usually male) Buddhists results in reproducing the hierarchies and power structures that we uncover in the field within our scholarship. Long debates in disciplines such as anthropology have questioned the ethics of foreign researchers entering into religious communities and undertaking their sacred rites, but the same conversation appears to have had less impact in Buddhist studies. It is not uncommon for foreign scholars, particularly those with a personal interest in Buddhism, to ordain for some period of their research, and ordination of any kind often brings with it a degree of academic clout. By turning a more critical eye toward the means and motives by which field engagements are chosen, it is clear that such methodologies limit access to and access for women (given gendered restrictions in many Buddhist lineages) as well as obscure the economic disparities that govern who chooses to be, or is forced by circumstance into becoming, ordained. Although it may be an unintentional creation, Bad Buddhism is of scholars’ own making.

Studying Bad Buddhism

The pressure to dismiss certain people and practices as Bad Buddhists and Bad Buddhism has led scholars to examine “deviant” material through the lens of a false consciousness, cultural derivations, degeneracy, or instrumentalism, rather than through the lens of religion. This is a problem, as we see it, because our interlocutors often understand these so-called “deviant” logics, affects, and relations to be the basis of their religious lives. To return to the pressing case of Myanmar, McKay found that Ma Ba Tha women constructed a Just War doctrine using the rhetorical materials provided by well-respected monks (Fuller 2018). They also drew from their own religious education to produce relevant stories: “In one story, Buddha in his past life killed a man. He saw that the man would kill 500 people in the future, so killing him was an act of compassion and choice of a lesser evil” (Husarski 2017: 70). By actively participating in a network of risk in which Buddhism and its adherents are understood as vulnerable to a threatening Muslim other, Ma Ba Tha women evoke a this-worldly labour of protection, without undermining their progression toward enlightenment. As one of McKay’s interlocutors told her,

For women, there are two nirvanas. The first nirvana comes from meditation and attending the pagoda and the dhamma talks. This is the Buddhist enlightenment. The second, comes when a woman has peace—no problems with children, no worries with a husband, and no trouble with money. This is also a kind of nirvana.

To ignore the religious dimensions of these women would be to render them doubly invisible, as women, but also as Buddhists engaging their beliefs in such a way as to justify certain acts of violence.

Scholars employ different strategies to square normative ideas about Buddhism with what they find on the ground. Some choose to explore divergences as sites of separation between doctrine, faith, and practice. Those who assert the lived nature of contemporary religion often find themselves
unconsciously or self-consciously writing ethnographies of Bad Buddhists and Bad Buddhism, as we did. However, in conceiving of this Special Focus, we wanted to see what happened when we positioned such divergences not as problems to be resolved, but as the most valuable source of analytical stuff. Put simply, what happens when we choose to write about, not write against Buddhism when talking about commerce, politics, drugs, and violence? This does not mean to ignore the normative constructions of Buddhism within scholarship or the lives of the communities we study. Quite the contrary, it means taking our informants’ often very complex ideas about Buddhism seriously as both data and theory. Rather than seeking to police the boundaries of Buddhism, we invited scholars to take those borderlands as their jumping-off point.

In September 2018, we convened a panel entitled “The good in ‘Bad Buddhism’: Beyond ancient wisdom for contemporary woes” at the Association of Social Anthropologists of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth, Oxford University. Anthropology is the disciplinary home for our research, and we find its method and ethics particularly helpful in this project because, as we suggested in the call for papers, anthropologists are “methodologically primed to resist reproducing orthodoxy” (perhaps “contrarian” is the less generous descriptor). We asked scholars working across all geographical regions to consider how their work’s engagement with consumerism, violence, or politics relates to a “thing called Buddhism” as it exists in academia, media, and popular culture. How might we view these phenomena as a part of Buddhism, rather than responses to social pressures cloaked in religious symbolism, for efficacy, influence, and popular acceptance? We were surprised by how many researchers from different disciplines answered the call and found that framing their work in this manner provoked news insights. Many of the papers in this Special Focus are the fruits of this conference. A subsequent open call for papers allowed us to balance the geographical, lineage, and thematic distribution of contributions, and to address equity issues that emerge from the demands of conference travel and funding.

Many scholars in this Special Focus argue for pluralising our religious narratives, suggesting that there exist multiple different “Buddhisms” for different actors—monastics, lay people, and scholars—all of which deserve our attention. Their contributions become a work of analysing the religious debates via which certain ideas become influential, common sense, or in some cases, violently enforced. As several contributors show, in between the practices and ideas that people fiercely defend as Buddhism and those that people denounce as something else entirely, there exist a range of more nuanced orientations, including “experimentation” (Nelson 2013), play, ambivalence, and “cultural intimacy” (Herzfeld 1997). For other scholars, the call for contributions on Bad Buddhism has prompted them to write about subjects and experiences within their research that they might otherwise have excluded from Buddhist studies publications, from counselling services to protest movements and drinking at bars. An unexpected and gratifying consequence of our call is the number of papers we received concerning Buddhist communities that are less prominent within Buddhist studies, including communities in Ladakh, Bangladesh, the Russian Republic of Buryatia, and Hong Kong. The diversity of subject matter and geographies demonstrates the new insights to be generated when we open the door to Bad Buddhism.

The Special Focus spans categories that might have previously prompted authors to exclude their work from the Buddhist studies canon. Several contributors describe examples of ‘monks
behaving badly’ and how communities themselves conceptualise their religious practice and its relationship to banal lives (see Casas; Singh). Contributors also highlight instrumental flaws, in Buddhism put to bad ends through its contemporary engagement with politics, protest, and violent nationalism (see Gajaweera; Sraman; Westerndorp). These contributions in particular spans numerous global locales, thereby reframing the recent violence in Myanmar as more than an exception within an otherwise pacifist global Buddhist community. Finally, several contributors consider practices and communities the edge of Buddhism, practices which people either doubt or deny are Buddhism, or through which people seek to transcend or reinvent that label (see Nelson; Jonutytė; Gould and Walters).

We believe the varied contributions provide readers with productive ways of thinking about Buddhism and its place in private and public life. We also hope that the Special Focus exemplifies new methods for reconciling Buddhist belief and practice with the discourses from which it continues to be siloed (politics, economics, etc.), so that the religious becomes a lens and not an afterthought. Should we be successful, readers will find within this collection of works opportunities for seeing how transglobal flows of people and ideas produce a liquid Buddhism (à la Bauman 1997) or “postmodern Buddhism” (Gleig 2019) that shapes and is shaped by a multitude of diverse actors and contextual factors. In so doing, we endeavour to produce an avenue of Buddhist studies that allows for more diversity in religious authority, and which comfortably extends into an as-yet unknown future. We are increasingly optimistic in the field’s ability to create a more inclusive and welcoming Buddhist studies that recognised marginalised actors (in the field and our universities) as key producers of theory and that bravely questions orthodoxy where it threatens to silence diverse voices.

References


