ISSN
1527-6457
R
e s e a r c h A r t i c l e
Debates
on Atheism, Quietism, and Sodomy: the Initial Reception of Buddhism
in Europe
by
Jürgen Offermanns
Lecturer, Dept. History of Religions
Lund University, Sweden
j.offermanns.rel.hist@telia.com
Abstract
The westernization
of Buddhism starts in the sixteenth century with the first Jesuit
missionary letters from China and Japan reporting about the peculiar
"religion of the Fo." Via these reports the Jesuits formed
a picture of Buddhism, which was to influence the understanding of
Buddhism in Europe until the twentieth century. The Jesuit reports
on Buddhism not only comprehended information regarding the Buddhist
teachings and practices, but also they were a broadside against religious
and political enemies of the order in Europe. The same applies for
the interpretation of Buddhism by European theologians, philosophers
and academics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The stereotypes
of Buddhism resulting from this are more a mirror image of European
intellectual history of religion than a serious effort to come to
an understanding of Asian religions.
At
the beginning of the twenty-first century European Buddhism is not
only the religion of Buddhists, but Buddhist practices and teachings
are being integrated in a Christian context and find themselves as
part of forms of New Age religions. The current manifestations of
Buddhism in Europe, however, started with the Jesuit missionary letters
from Japan and China in the sixteenth century. In doing so the Jesuits
formed a picture of Buddhism, which during the centuries was exposed
to quite different religious, political and social interests. Very
swiftly Buddhism developed from a religion of eyewitnesses (missionaries,
travellers) into a head-and-book religion, put down in writing by
people who had never ever visited Japan or China, let alone talked
to a Buddhist.
Thus the condition
of today's research in history of religions regarding the early reception
of Buddhism in Europe demands a deeper look into the past than what
has been done so far. In my opinion, propositions stating that Buddhism
was first "born" due to the social and intellectual alterations
of the Enlightenment in the West (Stephen Batchelor), that the early
western interpreters of Buddhism were not capable of distinguishing
Buddhism from other religions, or the view that India was the country
of origin of Buddhism first supported during the middle of the nineteenth
century (R. King), simply cannot be maintained. Another example is
Donald S. Lopez Jr., who writes as follows: "Buddhism was born
as an object of western knowledge rather late in Oriental Renaissance."
(The Oriental Renaissance dates to between 1680 — 1880; Lopez
argues for around 1800 as the natal hour of Buddhism in Europe)(1).
Similar theories neglecting the early reception of Buddhism in Europe
could be listed without trouble. Perhaps the reason behind this is
the deliberate or unconscious idea that the more recent the statement
regarding Buddhism, the more credible and scientific it becomes.
A close reading of
sixteenth century missionary letters indicates that Jesuits of that
period already knew more, in particular concerning Buddhism as a lived
tradition, than many an Orientalist of the nineteenth century.(2)
But the dating of the early reception of Buddhism in Europe also reveals
a predisposition, which still has not become extinct even to this
day, to accept a religion as an object of knowledge only when its
religious scripture is at hand. This prioritization of the written
word ignores the relevance of the early reception of Buddhism in Europe.
The "late birth" of Buddhism in Europe, however, also coincides
with the labour pains of Indology and Science of Religion as academic
subjects. Thus the Buddhist discourse obtained its legitimacy and
scientific authority, which fortunately was to differ prominently
from the "falsified" information of the missionaries and
the travel authors. Apparently the idea endures that pre-written and
pre-scientific sources regarding Buddhism are either apologetic (missionaries)
or, as in the case of the travel authors, only served to stimulate
the baser instincts in order to develop the sale of their books. Naturally
the missionary letters were permeated with apologetics and the travel
writers exaggerated, but this hardly distinguishes them from the works
of the Indologists and scholars of religion of the nineteenth century.
The fact that the early reception of Buddhism in Europe was based
on something other than the spread of Buddhist sutras does not mean
that the second-hand information of the missionaries and the travel
writers had less influence on the developing and changing understanding
of Buddhism in Europe.
Perhaps one still
could argue for the neglect of this type of reception of Buddhism,
had it not included characterizations of Buddhism that not only influenced
eighteenth and nineteenth century scholars, but to this day are an
essential element of the European discourse on Buddhism. The westernization
of Buddhism is therefore by no means only a phenomenon of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries; instead it commenced in the sixteenth century
with the first Jesuit missionary letters, which reported about the
extraordinary "religion of the Fo."
All Jesuit missionaries
were obliged to maintain contact by letter with the General of the
Society in Rome or with their priors in the home provinces. This policy
was already initiated by Ignatius of Loyola (1491 — 1556) with
the intention of strengthening the feeling of belonging of the missionaries,
being dispersed throughout the world, to the Society of Jesus. Furthermore
it was an instrument of control to supervise the missionary work outside
Europe as well as the situation in the provinces of the order. In
addition, the Jesuit order from the beginning used the letters as
propaganda for the Jesuit mission. (3)
These letters, which
could be up to a hundred pages long, and were summarized in the so
called annual letters, were revised and translated into the most different
languages, a task given to stylists within the order who were talented
in foreign languages. Thus prepared, the order passed on the letters
to the different Jesuit houses, schools, universities, scholars, and
to the rich and the powerful. The revised missionary reports became
a part of the teaching materials at the Jesuit educational establishments,
were quoted at the Sunday sermons, or were prepared as pieces of art
at the Jesuit theatres, where this genre was able to reach out also
to non-Jesuits.(4) They were also
included in periodical letter collections, such as Lettres édifiantes
et curiseuses (1702 — 1776) or Mémoires concernant
l´histoire, les sciences, les artes, les moeurs, les usages
etc des Chinois (1776 — 1814).
The annual letters,
which were intended for large audiences, were submitted to a more
severe censorship in order not to give a negative picture of the Jesuit
order, Christianity or the missionary methods. The same applied for
the different documentations or dissertations that were elaborated
by the Jesuit order on behalf of popes or regents, for example on
Japanese history, geography, or the Chinese language. Thus, a considerable
change in the primary sources had already taken place before a large
audience was able to get in contact with Buddhism.
Before I can elaborate
on the Jesuit interpretation of Buddhism, the question must be raised
whether the Jesuits or the various travel writers were at all able
to distinguish between Buddhism and other religions or between different
Buddhist traditions. The answer to the first question is a clear yes.
The Jesuits could, for instance, differentiate between Taoism, which
they called "the school of Lao-tzu" and Buddhism. The answer
to the second question is "sometimes" or "if they thought
it was necessary." The Jesuits admittedly named different Buddhist
traditions like "Jenxii," "Xenxus" (Zen Buddhism),
"Foquerus" (Nichiren Buddhism), "Omitose" (Amida
Buddhism) or "Ickois" (Jodo-Shin-Shu Buddhism), but they
are lumped together and evaluated "en gros." The
Jesuits mostly met Buddhism in the form of the Mahayana. Mahayana
Buddhist schools such as Zen Buddhism or Amida Buddhism were predominant
in their most important mission areas (Japan, China). Until the nineteenth
century a differentiation between Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism
was irrelevant in the European Buddhist reception. Neither in the
writings of Jesuits nor in those of the travel writers can a wider
difference be observed, indicating whether a report originates from
Pegu (Burma) or Siam, from Theravada Buddhist countries or from China
and Japan. With this in mind I have to emphasize that, for example,
the accusations against Zen Buddhism or Amida Buddhism at the same
time were a critique aimed at the entire Buddhist tradition and vice
versa.
Ingrained in the religious,
political and social circumstances of their times and bearing in mind
their self-conception as Jesuits, the Jesuit missionaries in Japan
and China did not have anything good to report about Buddhism. For
them the Buddhists were atheists, quietists, and sodomites. Their
religion was idolatry or superstition; their teachings were against
any reason and their monks disobeyed their own rules and cheated on
the people in order to make themselves rich. The travel writers drew
up similar descriptions in their books, which were becoming more and
more popular.
It is the focus of
my work to scrutinize what has become of these descriptions of the
Buddhist religion on European territory. How was the information of
the missionaries and the travellers interpreted and conveyed in Europe?
In order to summarize this, I would like, in due course and together
with some of these accusations, to undertake a time journey looking
at the history of religion in Europe. I would like to start with a
description of Buddhism as atheism.
Buddhism as atheism
During the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries the discussions about atheism, which hitherto
almost exclusively had taken place in theological circles and which
mainly had served to highlight each party’s own orthodoxy, had
conceived new seeds of discontent.(5)
Because of the mission reports and the travel literature, the well-tried
argument that if all people believe in God, no reasonable man can
question the existence of God, began to need explanation. These writings
not only reported about people who had not yet heard of God, but even
of a state (China), which apparently was governed rather successfully
by non-believers. Moreover, the Cartesian assertion that the material
world was incapable of putting across knowledge about an immaterial
entity, gnawed at the ethnological/historical proof of God's existence.
Another catalyst of an updated atheism discussion was the resurgence
of the ancient philosophers since the renaissance, who when read accurately
partially spread disbelief. And then there also were the natural scientists,
who presumptuously questioned the existence of God. And during the
Rites Controversy, time and time again clashes occurred over the question
whether Confucius was a heathen, a pantheist or atheist.
The Rites Controversy,
which started in the beginning of the seventeenth century, not only
influenced the discourse on atheism during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries but also affected the interpretation of Buddhism as a whole.(6)
This controversy concerned the Jesuit missionary strategy, which had
pursued a policy of tolerance and adaptation to Chinese culture, and
had been attacked by other Roman Catholic missionaries as intolerable
compromise with heathen beliefs and practices. The Jesuits accepted,
for example, the ceremonies honouring Confucius as a civil rite, which
they thought had nothing to do with idolatry. They also allowed converts
to continue to perform the cult of their ancestors, as an expression
of respect, not worship. The Church finally condemned the Jesuit standpoint
in 1742 with the papal decree ?Ex quo singulari,? thus ruining the
Jesuit mission. This action convinced the Chinese that Christianity
was a dangerous sect, and it was officially proscribed. However, in
1939, almost two centuries later, the decree was rescinded by Pope
Pius XII, who authorized Chinese Christians to observe the ancestral
rites and also to take part in ceremonies honouring Confucius.
From today's point
of view it can be hard to appreciate why the Rites Controversy caused
such intense and frenzied discussions all over Europe for more than
a hundred years. It was not confined to ecclesiastical circles but
the entire intellectual elite of Europe felt compelled to express
an opinion on this matter. In the late seventeenth century, Pierre
Bayle (1647 — 1706) described the debates as follows: "The
whole of Europe is ringing with their missions; they accuse each other
at Rome; congregations of cardinals, the Sorbonne, princes, authors
are all of a flutter, and have worked themselves up into quite a frenzy
over them" (Delumeau 1977:94-95).
The Jesuits tried
to defend their standpoint by secularizing and de-ritualising Confucianism.
They represented Confucius in their writings as a respectable scholar
guided by high moral and social standards. It was this secularized
Confucianism which attracted attention in Europe and made Confucius
into a hero of the Enlightenment.
In contrast to an
idealized Confucianism compatible with Christian religiosity, the
Jesuits described Buddhism as idolatrous. Buddhism was considered
an antithesis of Confucianism. The virtues of Confucius were opposed
to the vices of Buddha. Confucianism represented the true China while
Buddhism was a foreign religion imported from the suffocating areas
of India. The Jesuit interpretations of Confucianism and Buddhism
were broadly accepted by the supporters of the Enlightenment, although
while the Jesuits thought of the Confucians as heathen but with high
potential to become good Christians, les philosophes regarded
Confucians as solid empirical evidence that atheists could successfully
run a state.
But what did Christians,
Protestants and Jesuits actually mean when they used the term ?atheist?
as an insult in the sixteenth century? A first answer is given by
a Protestant from Lausanne, Pierre Viret, who in 1564 wrote the following
in his book Instruction Christienne:
For when Saint Paul,
in the epistle to the Ephesias, called the pagans 'atheists' he declared
that not merely those who denied all divinity were without God but
also those who did not know the true God and followed strange gods
instead of him (Febvre 1982:132).
Thus an atheist was
somebody who believed in the "wrong" God, in a God that
one did not believe in himself. With this not only heathens, Jews,
and Muslims were potential atheists, but also apostatizing Christians.
Catholics saw Protestants as atheists and vice versa. Naturally Buddhism
could be placed into the multitude of atheist religions without great
difficulty. This sort of conception of atheism perceives therefore
no contradiction in characterizing a Buddhist as an atheist and polytheist
at the same time.
But how would one
become an atheist? For the orthodox the matter was clear. Atheism
is not the result of human reason, but a mental problem, an indisposition
of the mind, which prevents salutary Christian thinking.(7)
Apart from the devil, the causes triggering off this "monstrous
melancholy" were poison spread by scepticism, immorality, curiosity,
intellectual conceitedness, slothfulness, stupidity, ambition, and
literature.
Thus one does not
attain atheistic convictions through sanity and reason, but it is
human volition that makes one an atheist. It are the immoral human
beings with perverted habits who want to become atheists. It is their
depraved morals that debunks them as atheists.(8)
So for the Jesuits
and their readers in the sixteenth and seventeenth century the Buddhists
were atheist, not just because they did not believe in God but because
they believed in the wrong God, namely the Buddha. Towards the end
of the seventeenth century the conception of atheism in Europe changed.
It probably was Pierre Bayle who expressed this most effectively.
He came to the conclusion that superstition was worse than atheism,
that a state of atheists was possible and that atheism did not inevitably
have to lead to moral decadence.
A glance at the criticism
of superstition within the early German Enlightenment offers an approach
to develop this alteration in the European discourse of atheism. With
their criticism of superstition, men like Christian Thomasius (1655
— 1728) were positioned between orthodox Christianity and more
radical atheist philosophers such as Pierre Bayle or later Paul Henry
d'Holbach (1723 — 1789).
For Thomasius an atheist
is not only a human denying God but somebody who believes God and
creatures to be one and the same thing, or someone who submits God
to a higher fate and therefore one who must repudiate God. An atheist
becomes what he is due to far too meticulous reflection on outward
things. He wants to know more and more and in doing so he stretches
the limits of reason, in consequence of which he lapses into an intellectual
hubris, precluding the ability to genuine realization of God. Reason
becomes foolishness and self-love.
In contrast to this,
the one committed to idolatry, the one who is addicted to superstition,
is one who, contrary to all reason, takes for God what cannot possibly
be God (Cp. Pott 1992:95). While the atheist used his apprehension
too excessively, thinking has become stagnant in the case of the superstitious
one. Also the moral consequences for which atheists and superstitious
individuals have to account are different.
According to Thomasius
the atheist, since he does not believe in God, cannot make God the
object of his love. And in the same way that he is unable to love
God it is also impossible for him to love his fellow man. Only his
existent, but nevertheless errant mind prevents him from ruining himself
with his immoral life. It is self-love which saves him from the worst.
In Thomasius' thinking this atheistic pseudo-morality lowers the atheist
to the animal level.
Hence Thomasius condemns
superstitiousness even more than atheism. Both lack the true faith,
but while the atheist at least can keep his cacoethes under control,
the superstitious individual utterly turns into the victim of his
passions. With the Enlightenment proceeding, the ratio of reason increases
until men like d'Holbach assume atheism to be the logical consequence
of reasonable thinking. While the atheist was able to improve his
reputation during the eighteenth century, the supporters of the Enlightenment
impetuously attacked the superstitious individual. Superstition offered
them an excellent starting point to demonstrate Christianity's unreasonableness.
Obviously lacking the gift of apprehension, the superstitious individual
was diametrically different from the picture that the supporters of
the Enlightenment had of themselves. They opposed superstitious religions
like Christianity and Buddhism using their natural and rational deism
or atheism.
For the reception
of Buddhism by enlightened philosophers this had the following consequences.
The atheistic Buddhism of the sixteenth century had turned into a
superstitious Buddhism since the end of the seventeenth century. Accusations
stating that Buddhism was atheistic increasingly vanished during the
eighteenth century. The Enlightenment's attitude of criticism towards
religion and its hostility towards Christianity bestowed the term
atheism with positive connotations, making an assumption of this term
for Buddhism impossible. For the philosophers, Buddhism, exactly like
Christianity, was a religion of superstition, which apparently contradicted
the laws of nature and rationality. In the words of Leibniz the Buddha
was an "accursed idol." But one ought to bear in mind that
the philosophers of the Enlightenment admittedly were part of a group
of influential intellectuals that affected the reception of Buddhism
in the eighteenth century, but they were small in numbers and they
were not the only voices. In what follows, I would therefore like
to dwell on the Jesuit's Jean Baptiste Du Halde's understanding of
Buddhism to demonstrate that even Catholic scholars were influenced
by the changing discourse of atheism in the eighteenth century.
In 1735 the voluminous
work of the French Jesuit Jean Baptiste Du Halde (1674 — 1743)
Description Géographique, Historique, Chronologique, Politique
et Physique de L' Empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie Chinoise
was published. Swiftly after the first release it was translated into
all the major European languages (English,1736, 1741; German, 1747).
Du Halde himself never was in China but instead he relied totally
on his missionizing brothers in the Jesuit order and in isolated cases
on travel reports. Du Halde conveys that the Buddha called together
his followers shortly before his demise: "…and then, to
crown all his Impieties, he disgorged all the Poison of Atheism"
(Du Halde 1741:650). This came about because Fo conceptualized his
teaching in parables and metaphors only during the last forty years,
but that he now would reveal the intrinsic secret of his doctrine:
"Learn then, sayed he to them, that there is no
other Principle of all Things but Emptiness and Nothing: From Nothing
all Things proceed, and into Nothing all will return, and this is
the End of all our Hopes" (In italics in the original; Du
Halde 1741:650).
In Du Halde's writing
the Buddhist Shunyata doctrine becomes the primordial and the "real"
teaching of the Buddha, who therewith did not preach anything other
than atheism. But this atheism, in Du Halde's opinion, fell on deaf
ears among the followers of the Fo. Most of them remained with their
old teachings, which were all but atheistic: "…and their
Doctrine is directly opposite to Atheism" (Du Halde 1741:650).
At this point it is very interesting — and I will later return
to this — that even the Jesuit Du Halde apparently seems to differentiate
between superstition and atheism.
The superstitious
Buddhists, who remain loyal to the old, idolatrous doctrine, continue
to devote themselves to their rituals and their brainless speculations.
They follow the "exterior Doctrine:" "The last word
of Fo, when he was dying, gave rise to a sect of Atheists among a
few Bonzas: But the greater Part of them was not able to shake off
the Prejudices of their Education, persevered in the first Errors
their Master had taught" (Du Halde 1741:651). In contrast to
the "interior Doctrine" the exterior doctrine is more suitable
for the common people, who due to their limited power of comprehension
have to be introduced to the interior doctrine by means of the exterior
doctrine.
The Jesuit differentiation
between "interior" and "exterior" doctrines of
Buddhism had its parallels in the Catholic differentiation between
the "exterior" appearance of religious ceremonies and their
"interior" meaning. The separation of a ceremony's exterior
from its interior dimension was in particular used by Jesuits in their
defence against Protestant accusations of alleged Catholic idolatry.
This delimination made it possible for the Jesuits to come to the
defence of Catholicism but also of "pagan" religions such
as Confucianism. Although they criticized the "exterior"
rituals of the Confucians, they however discovered an "interior"
core of truth behind it. In my opinion, the reason why the Jesuits
did not use this dichotomy for their evaluation of Buddhism in its
positive sense is based on the fact that even with the best intention
the Jesuits were not able to bring together the interior doctrine
of Buddhism and the interior doctrine of Christianity. Atheism, nihilism,
and mortal souls simply could not be understood from an "interior"
point of view.
After Du Halde had
held forth about the abstruse imaginations and rituals of the "exterior"
Buddhists in considerable length, towards the end of his writings
he starts to speak about the "interior" doctrine of the
Buddhists (Cp. Du Halde 1741:657). According to Du Halde only a few
initiates, provided with "sublime genius," actually are
capable of understanding this interior doctrine. For Du Halde the
interior doctrine gives evidence to what nonsense and intellectual
extravaganza the human mind is capable of.
They teach that
a Vacuum, or Nothing, is the Beginning and End of all Things; that
from Nothing our first Parents had their Original, and to Nothing
they returned after their Death; that the Vacuum is what constitutes
our Being and Substance; that from this Nothing, and the Mixture of
the Elements, all Things were produced, and to them shall return;
that all Beings differ from one another only by their Shape and Qualities,
in the same Manner as Snow, Ice and Hail differ from each other;…[They]
loose their Shape and Qualities, but remain the same as to Substance
(Du Halde 1741:657).
This substance or
this principle is pure, free of alterations and possesses the simplicity,
which represents the perfection of every being. This principle does
not possess energy, power or comprehensibility. It is the point that
its essence is empty of comprehensibility, deeds and wishes. To achieve
this, states Du Halde, one must meditate. At this point Du Halde's
report on the Buddhist Shunyata doctrine of the "interior"
Buddhists, which so far had been rather objective, becomes more polemic.
In order to live
happily we must continually strive by Meditation, and frequent Victories
over ourselves, to become like this Principle, and to this Purpose
must accustom ourselves to do nothing, to wish for nothing, to be
sensible of nothing and to think of nothing; Vices or Virtues, Rewards
or Punishments, Providence and the Immortality of the Soul are quite
of the Question; all Holiness consists in ceasing to be, and in being
swallowed by Nothing. The nearer one approaches the nature of a Stone,
or the Trunk of a Tree, the more perfect he is; in short, it is in
Indolence and Inactivity, in a Cessation of all Desires, in a Privation
of every Motion of the Body, in an Annihilation of all the Faculties
of the Soul, and in the general Suspension of all Thought, that Virtue
and Happiness consist. When a Man has once attained this blessed State
all his Vicissitudes and Transmigrations being at an end, he has nothing
to fear afterwards, because properly speaking he is nothing; or if
he is any thing he is happy, and to say every thing in one Word, he
is perfectly like the god Fo (Du Halde 1741:657).
Already in the beginning
of his report Du Halde made clear that atheistic poison was running
through the veins of the "interior" Buddhists. Looking at
what was quoted above, he now completes the stereotypes used for the
Christian interpretation of Shunyata. According to Du Halde, to accomplish
a state of absolute inanimateness by virtue of meditation, the Buddhists
must cease thinking and feeling. Here Du Halde obviously saw quietism
lurking; and the Jesuits were extremely critical of quietism.
In the European contexts
the Jesuits connected quietism with Jansenistic bigotry, which apparently
contradicted the Jesuits "via activa". The "via
contemplativa" exercised by the Jesuits (Spiritual Exercises)
was however thought of as a preparation to be able to practice the
active cure of souls more effectively. According to the Jesuits it
therefore could not be compared to the passive bigotry of the Jansenites.
To release oneself from social life was against the fundamental laws
of the Jesuits.
According to Du Halde's
view, the inanimate meditator merges into nothingness, thereby averting
further reincarnations. Nothing remains except for the nothingness/emptiness,
in which also the god Fo lingers. In this way the meditator becomes
like the god Fo, because also that god is nothingness. This rendition
of the Buddhist Shunyata doctrine comprises an implicated accusation
of nihilism. However, I cannot imagine how Du Halde could have drawn
other conclusions. The accusation of nihilism was long-lasting and
in the beginning of the twentieth century D. T. Suzuki (1869 —
1960) still tried to resist it. Du Halde and his Jesuit primary sources
lacked the insights in Buddhist philosophy needed to avoid such misinterpretations.
And what they read and heard, they appraised in accordance with the
interpretive parameters stipulated to them by the Christian faith
and the occidental philosophy tradition. Of course there were atomists,
materialists and other misbelieving riff-raff, but the conception
of a nothingness as the last principle was out of any serious discussion.
Du Halde makes Confucian
scholars, which are harsh on the "interior" doctrine of
Buddhism, the mouthpiece of his indignation. According to Du Halde
the Confucians controvert the "interior" Buddhists:
...with all their
Might, proving that this Apathy, or rather this monstrous Stupidity,
of neither doing nor thinking of any thing, overturned all Morality
and civil Society; that Man is Superior to other Beings, only in that
he thinks, reasons, applies himself to the Knowledge of Virtue, and
practices it. That to aspire after this foolish Inactivity, is renouncing
the most essential Duties, and abolishing the necessary Relation of
Father and Son, Husband and Wife, Prince and Subject; that in short
if this Doctrine was followed, it would reduce all the Members of
a State to a Condition much inferior to that of Beasts (Du Halde 1741:657).
This was an assessment
of Buddhism and its doctrines, which even the French Jesuit Du Halde
could sign. The asocial effect of the interior doctrine of Buddhism
is focused by the Confucian critique and hence in that of Du Halde's.
The quietism of petrified bonzes, not thinking and not feeling, displaces
the humans even under the level of animals. The atheistic interior
doctrine of Buddhism was a threat to the social order. At this point
Du Halde indirectly enters into the stormy debate that took place
during the Enlightenment, over the question whether an atheistic state
with moral values would be possible. Here Du Halde argues against
such a thesis, which had haunted people's minds since Pierre Bayles
had published his "comet book."(9)
Du Halde sees a qualitative difference between superstition and atheism.
The superstition of the exterior doctrine of Buddhism is formed and
conditioned by the intellectual backwardness of its followers, pitiable
beings who are impelled by their passions and fears. It is the religion
of the common people, an easy prey for the cunning bonzes. Du Halde
concedes at least intelligence to the atheistic Buddhists who practice
the interior doctrine, even though they misuse it for atheistic/nihilistic
trains of thought.
The arguments Du Halde
uses against these atheists give evidence of his knowledge about the
ongoing religious discourse in Europe. In 1735, the time when Description
was accumulated, Du Halde could not cope with the atheists, using
accusations of sodomy and deviltries; if he wanted to be taken seriously
he had to apply his critique using present-day questions.(10)
The enlightened spirit of Du Halde's time was open for the social
implications of different forms of religions, as the enthusiasm for
Confucianism's social politics clearly showed. Had Du Halde held on
to the old schemes of faith and morality, faithlessness and immorality,
he would probably have reached a loyal, already proselytized audience,
but not the scholars who were critical towards the church. The supporters
of the Enlightenment were only too well aware of the social values
of the religions and therefore they most certainly took Du Halde's
objections against Buddhism and atheism seriously.
It might be surprising
that the Jesuit Du Halde, in accordance with the style of the Enlightenment,
differentiated between superstition and atheism, but in his office
as publisher of an influential academic newspaper Du Halde was in
focus of the intellectual discourses in France. And at the beginning
of the eighteenth century they took place under the sign of Enlightenment
theories. Du Halde was one of the Jesuit "scriptores librorum,"
a group of men who were the "journalists" of the Jesuit
order in Paris (Cp. Northeast 1991:3). In their hands lay the publication
of Mémoires de Trévoux, in which academic topics
were debated. But directed by the "scriptores,"
scripts and books addressing the most diverse areas of expertise were
also prepared. Jesuit journalists like Du Halde maintained constant
contact with "worldly scholars," with whom they kept in
lively, cooperative interchange.
As the journalistic
spearhead of the French Jesuits, it was the task of the scriptores
to observe the academic world, to criticize and to contribute their
own articles. But between the Jesuits and the supporters of the Enlightenment
there existed not only a professional contact via the written word.
Often the Jesuits and the enlighteners had been to the same Jesuit
schools and thus they received the same education (Bayle, Voltaire,
Diderot, Fontanelle a.o. were former Jesuit pupils). Moreover it was
mostly Jesuits who brought up and educated the children of the aristocracy
and who administered the confession for their parents. In this way
a network of personal relations between Jesuits and the intellectual
and political elite of France developed, a fact that all parties appreciatively
used to their own advantage.
The professional and
the private contacts of the Jesuits and the supporters of the Enlightenment
certainly were one reason why they respected each other, even though
they had different opinions. In addition it had been the policy of
the Jesuits to keep themselves out of politics and to forbear from
excessively gross polemic. For this reason a propitious climate for
dialogue between Jesuits and supporters of the Enlightenment developed,
even though difficult topics such as atheism and morality were on
the agenda (Cp. Northeast 1991:34-44). The situation first changed
in the middle of the eighteenth century, as extremes increasingly
came to a head and the Jesuit order had to fight for its survival,
and when a new generation of scriptores took up the nib and
fell back into the well known apologetic and polemic schemes. The
target of the Jesuit critique now was mostly Pierre Bayle's Dictionnaire
and his thesis of the virtuous atheist. Up to that point the Jesuits
had treated Bayle with noble reserve; admittedly some objections were
raised against his assertions, but at the same time they praised him
for his learnedness over and over again (Cp. Northeast 1991:40-44).
But the growing popularity of Bayle's ideas alarmed the Jesuits, which
in the 1730s gave way to deal more critically with Bayle's idea of
moral atheists with the capability to run a state. For example, the
Jesuit Charles Porée (1675 — 1741) did not question Bayle's
learnedness, instead he brought an action against his position for
"…its lack of moral purpose: based on impious and therefore
unreliable sources…," and therefore his "…irreligious
argument can never stem from sincere conviction but is always motivated
by deliberate ill-will, the 'libertinage du coeur' which alone gives
rise to 'libertinage de esprite'? (Northeast 1991:42.).
Here the honorable
Porée fell back on an obsolete critique of atheism, which saw
atheism not as a result of the mind, but instead as the fruit of moral
shortcomings. Using this line of argumentation the Jesuits accused
Pierre Bayle of malice aforethought and questioned his moral integrity.
That in turn evoked moroseness among the Enlightenment inspired friends
of Bayle. The positions of both parties became increasingly obdurate
and polemic gained the upper hand.
It is this context
in which Du Halde's critique of Buddhist atheism must be understood.
Unlike Porée, Du Halde does not place the atheists’ immorality
in the foreground but rather the aspects of atheism that destroy the
public order. Du Halde places emphasis on atheism's social consequences,
which in time demoralize the community, and the state from the inside.
In Du Halde's writings atheism becomes a social, collective problem
and not so much one of personal moralistic preferences. This does
not mean that Du Halde thinks of the atheists as virtuous people,
he merely does not use Description to constantly rub in their
immorality. Doing so Du Halde keeps the atheism discussion on a textual
level, without offending the supporters of the Enlightenment personally.
In my judgment this was a clever move by Du Halde, considering that
he was willing to carry on with a fruitful dialogue with the critics.
The enlighteners thanked him by repeatedly referring to Du Halde in
their own works and by accepting his Description as credible
literature.
During the nineteenth
century the former atheistic Buddhism that had mutated to the superstitious
Buddhism, developed into an atheistic Theravada Buddhism and a superstitious
Mahayana Buddhism. Indologists and scholars of science of religion
had discovered the "real" Buddhism in the Pali canon of
Theravada Buddhism, and without a doubt it was atheistic.
Japanese Zen Buddhism
can in this matter serve as a good example of the negative attitude
towards Mahayana. It was seen as an abhorrent variety of the already
degenerated and superstitious Mahayana Buddhism. This prejudice against
Zen Buddhism did not only exist in Europe but Zen Buddhism was also
fiercely criticized in its Japanese homeland. In course of the political
and social shifts of the Meiji restoration the leading religion of
the Tokugawa period turned into a superstitious, asocial and parasitic
religion, an obstacle on Japan's way into a modern, rosy future.
While an atheistic,
rationalistic Theravada Buddhism, compatible with the latest findings
of science and psychology, soon was able to attract followers on European
soil, Zen Buddhism, like other schools of Mahayana Buddhism, continued
to be the victim of prejudice. In the case of Zen Buddhism it was
the merit of D. T. Suzuki and later Rudolf Otto (1869 — 1937),
to react to these accusations and to deliver an adequate answer.(11)
Concerning the description of Zen Buddhism as
atheistic, the two responded with an ingenious reply. Due to the differentiation
of Zen Buddhism and Zen, between the forms of expression in consequence
of the history and culture of this religion (Zen Buddhism) and its
non-historical, universal, indescribable and, for rational thinking,
inaccessible essence (Zen), descriptions like "atheistic"
become less important. To describe a religion as atheistic only makes
sense if one is moving about at the level of its cultural and historical
forms of expression. The absolute essence, the numinous or the pure
experience, is neither Christian, nor Zen Buddhist nor atheistic but
it can be experienced by Christians, Zen Buddhists, and Atheists.
Buddhism as sodomy
The Jesuits’
abhorrence and judgement of Buddhistic sodomy was standard in Europe
and sanctioned by the Church. The Church condemned all kinds of sexual
acts that did not lead to reproduction. Masturbation, anal intercourse
and homosexuality were, according to Thomas Aquina, regarded as the
worst sins after murder because they were against the divine order.
"Men sought from behind what they ought to find in front."(12)
Before, Christians had above all blamed Muslim
men for these sexual practices, whose preference for young men was
notorious. If someone was proved to practise sodomy the punishment
was death. Soon the sodomy accusations were inflated and they were
liberated from the sexual connotations and transformed into a frequently
used slogan used to make one's religious, political and private enemies
loose their reputation. Thus for Luther, Turks, Jews, papists and
cardinals were sodomites "en gros."
The Jesuit missionaries
in Japan and China lament again and again about the sexual laxity
of the common people. Matteo Ricci wrote from China: "The entire
kingdom is full of public prostitutes, quite apart from the cases
of domestic adultery, which are well enough known" (Spence 1985:219).
Especially he was shocked about the extent of male homosexuality in
China. Around 1610 he wrote: "That which most shows the misery
of these people is that no less than the natural lusts they practice
unnatural ones that reverse the order of things: and this is neither
forbidden by law or thought to be illicit, nor even a cause of shame"
(Spence 1985:220).
Among the different
Buddhist schools, Matteo Ricci especially criticized the Chan Buddhists,
whom he describes as particularly vulgar. Their moral decadence primarily
is shown in the attitude of the monks, who make a farce out of their
vows of celibacy or even worse — engage in sodomy. Ricci shows
no mercy with his Buddhist colleagues: "They live in a truly
dissolute way, and not only do many of them have wives and children,
which is forbidden by their monastic rule, they are also robbers,
and killers of those who pass along the road" (Spence 1985:211).
The Jesuits described
the sexual situation in Japan likewise as menacing. There, homosexuality
was to their consternation even regarded as honourable (Cp. Schurhammer
1973:170-172). In an open letter from Japan in 1549 the Jesuit Francis
Xavier (1506 — 1552) expressed his shock at the extent to which
homosexuality was entrenched among the priests of Japanese Buddhism.
The priests used the young boys, sent to them to be educated, for
their sexual pleasure, and laughed when questioned about it. "The
evil has simply become a habit…the priests are drawn to sins
against nature and don't deny it, they acknowledge it openly. This
evil, furthermore, is so public, so clear to all, men and women, young
and old, and they are so used to seeing it that they are neither depressed
nor horrified" (Spence 1985: 224).
Accusations of sodomy
against Buddhist were particularly prominent in the travel literature.
Partially this can be explained by the publisher's demand for good
selling books and we all know, sex sells. One example should be sufficient
to demonstrate the travel writer’s approach to Buddhist moral
behaviour. The French Protestant François Caron (1600 —
1673), who lived and worked in Japan for twenty years, wrote in 1645
his A True Description of the Mighty Kingdoms of Japan & Siam,
a true best-seller. The originally Dutch edition was soon translated
into all major European languages (English 1663 and 1671). (13)
Caron's report on
Japanese Buddhism turns very soon from more religious philosophical
themes to describing the moral of the twelve Buddhist sects. These
make taverns out of their temples, where people go to relax: "...they
assemble here, and in the presence of their Gods, and company of their
Priests, (who are likewise good fellows) they debauch and do those
extravagances, which are the concomitants of excess and folly"
(Caron & Schouten 1935:43). Ordinary prostitutes are asked to
dance and entertain visitors, such as priests. It seems as if no one
bothers about these excesses. Because the inhabitants and the priests
neither have interest in discussing religious matters, nor in persuading
anyone into their faith. Finally, Caron cannot pass over the sodomy
accusation: "Their Priests, as well as many of the Gentry, are
much given to Sodomy, that unnatural passion, being esteemed no sin,
nor shameful thing amongst them" (Caron & Schouten 1935:43).
Once more I have to
accentuate the fact that these accusations were not limited to Japanese
or Chinese Mahayana Buddhist but likewise were directed against Theravada
Buddhists. Joost Schouten's Description Of Siam (1636) may
serve as just one example. Schouten, chief of the Dutch East India
Company in Batavia, also sees only idolaters in the Buddhists, devoted
to a pantheon of gods. He mentions the Buddhist transmigration of
souls, eating habits (vegetarian or not), the parasitism of the monks
and the decadence and sexual laxity of the Buddhist priests. But his
lament over Buddhist immorality could not save his own life. His career
took an abrupt ending as in 1644 he was accused and found guilty of
sodomy. As mentioned above, the punishment for this in Christian Europe
was death. In July 1644 Schouten was strangled in public in Batavia,
his body was burnt afterwards and his belongings confiscated.
During the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries the Jesuits' characterizations of the Buddhists
as sodomites were closely linked to the accusation of atheism. The
association of faith and morality as well as of faithlessness and
immorality was so implicit that everyone drew that conclusion. To
live a decent and proper life was only possible within the framework
of the right Christian faith. In the course of the seventeenth century,
but at the very latest during the Enlightenment, the implicit connection
made between faith and morality was looked upon with reservation.
To this the Jesuits themselves, certainly not deliberately, added
their bit, because during the Rites Controversy they had secularized
Confucianism and presented Confucius as a scholar led by honourable
ideals and morally irreproachable intentions. By doing so, the Jesuits
delivered the empirical evidence that infidels can live a moral life.
This in connection with the creeping power loss of the Christian churches
during the seventeenth century contributed to the fact that the association
of atheism and immorality was interrupted by the supporters of the
Enlightenment, deists and atheists of the eighteenth century. Sodomy,
homosexuality and immorality had social causes — a worldly problem,
not necessarily with religious implications. For Buddhism this meant
that the accusations of chronic sodomy to a large extent were moved
into the background. If enlighteners vented an opinion on the subject
of Buddhism, they would do so under the topic of religion and sodomy
had been reinterpreted as a worldly problem. During the nineteenth
century accusation of sodomy held against Buddhism only appeared sporadically
in cases such as the Christian missionary hardliners or the polemics
against the Buddhists after Meiji restoration, 1868. Neither D. T.
Suzuki nor Rudolf Otto felt forced to defend Buddhism against accusations
of sodomy. The fact that the conception of the immoral Buddhist still
was not totally extinct became obvious in the 1960s, when polemic
was used against the beatniks and ?flower power? Buddhists, who apparently
practiced a very free sexual behaviour.
Buddhism as quietism
Contrary to the ups
and downs of the allegations of atheism and sodomy directed against
Buddhism, the allegations of quietism against the religion of the
Fo was more abiding. Despite their own ambiguities, the Jesuits, since
their foundation, repeatedly had criticised quietist tendencies within
Christianity, such as the quietism exemplified by the Alumbrados,
Jansenists, the Calvinists, or such Quietists as Madame Guyon (1648
— 1717). Hence the Jesuits condemned in their letters from Japan
and China to their European readers not only the quietism of the Buddhists
but also at the same time quietist lines within the Christian Church.
Quietism degenerated into a catchword, that, taken out of its European
theological context, was transferred to pagan idolaters. Via the missionary
letters the quietism accusation returned to Europe, where Jansenists
or Protestants in that way could be related to heathen Buddhists.
The Jesuits, and as
their successors interpreters of European Buddhism such as Athanasius
Kircher (1602 — 1680), G. W. Leibniz (1646 — 1716), François
Marie de Marsy (1710 — 1763) or G. W. F. Hegel (1770 — 1831),
viewed the Buddhist meditation practices and the Buddhist Shunyata
doctrine as evidence for the Buddhists' highest aim, the liberation
from all action and emotion. In this apathy the Buddhist were believed
to become equal to their gods in the pagodas. The western interpreters,
however, condemned quietism not only for theological reasons, but
also because of its asocial consequences. The quietism of petrified
bonzes was a danger for state and society, as it had to result in
the crash of social life.
An advocate of this
kind of interpretation of Buddhism is the German philosopher G. W.
Leibniz. He owed his knowledge about China and its religions almost
completely to the Jesuits. The reports of Matteo Ricci and Nichola
Longobardi (1565 — 1655), who Leibniz only knew through their
writings, exerted significant influence on Leibniz. But he also maintained
contact with the Jesuits of his own generation. Noteworthy is his
well-known correspondence with the French Jesuit Joachim Bouvet (1656
— 1732). Furthermore the private library of Leibniz indicates
that he read most of the contemporaneous books on China available
in Europe, like Athanasius Kircher's China Illustrata (1667)
or Louis-Daniel Le Comte's (1655 — 1728) Nouveaux mémoires
sur l´état présent de la Chine (1696).(14)
In his Theodicee
(1710) Leibniz compares the concept of a soul within Averroism and
Buddhism. Averroism was a theological/philosophical interpretation
among scholastics in the thirteenth century based on Averroes' (Ibn
Rushd, 1126 — 1198) understanding of Aristotle. Averroes maintained
that the soul was divided in one individual part and one divine part.
The individual soul dies with the body while the divine part returns
to the divine soul which all humans share. Leibniz wrote:
Die Vernichtung
von allem, was uns zu eigen angehört und die von den Quietisten
sehr weit getrieben wird, dürfte bei Manchem auch nur eine verstellte
Gottlosigkeit sein, wie das, was man von dem Quietismus des Foe berichtet,
dem Gründer einer großen Sekte in China. Nachdem er 40
Jahre seine Religion gepredigt hatte und sich dem Tode nahe fühlte,
erklärte er seinen Schülern, daß er ihnen die Wahrheit
unter dem Schleier von Bildern verhüllt habe, und daß alles
auf Nichts zurückkomme, welches Nichts das oberste Prinzip der
Dinge sei. Dies war, wie es scheint, noch schlimmer, als die Meinung
der Averroisten. Beide Lehren können nicht aufrecht erhalten
werden und überschreiten die wahren Grenzen (Leibniz 1879:41-42).
According to Leibniz,
the negation of an individual and eternal soul is atheism in disguise.
Then he draws a parallel to quietism, probably having in mind quietists
within Catholicism (Jansenists, Madame Guyon, Miguel Molinos (1640
— 1696, etc.) who are looking for salvation in the union of the
soul with God. This concept came close to Averroistic ideas and questioned
the existence of an individual eternal soul. In Leibniz's opinion,
the averroistic assumption of a mortal soul must lead to an immoral
and destructive life-style because there is no individual soul who
could be punished or rewarded after death. The religion of Fo still
goes one step further. The Buddhists not only deny an individual eternal
soul but even the existence of an eternal divine soul. Instead they
seek fulfilment in the realisation of their highest principle, called
Nothingness, through meditation, through the liberation from all action
and emotion.
About a hundred years
later the European interpretation of Buddhism as quietism was still
alive. G. W. H. Hegel discussed Buddhism more closely in his Vorlesungen
über die Philosophie der Religion. The first quotation of
Hegel renders the 300 year old Jesuit explanation of the Buddhist
Shunyata doctrine:
...das Nichts und das Nichtsein ist das Letzte und Höchste. Nur
das Nichts hat wahrhafte Selbstständigkeit, alle andre Wirklichkeit,
alles Besondere hat keine. Aus Nichts ist Alles hervorgegangen, in
Nichts geht Alles zurück. Das Nichts ist das Eine, der Anfang
und das Ende von Allem (Hegel 1971:403).
According to Hegel,
the Buddhist ontology must lead to apathy:
...seine Bestimmung
[des Menschen] ist, sich zu vertiefen in dieses Nichts, die ewige
Ruhe, das Nichts überhaupt ist das Substantielle, wo alle Bestimmungen
aufhören, kein Wille, keine Intelligenz ist. Durch fortwährendes
Vertiefen und Sinnen in sich soll der Mensch diesem Prinzip gleich
werden, er soll ohne Leidenschaft sein, ohne Neigung, ohne Handlung
und zu diesem Zustand kommen, Nichts zu wollen und Nichts zu thun.
Da ist von Tugend, Laster, Versöhnung, Unsterblichkeit keine
Rede; die Heiligkeit des Menschen ist, daß er in dieser Vernichtung,
in diesem Schweigen sich vereint mit Gott, dem Nichts, dem Absoluten.
Im Aufhören aller Regung des Körpers, aller Bewegung der
Seele besteht das Höchste...da ist er identisch mit Gott (Hegel1971:412).
Hegel's understanding
of Buddhist ontology and the methods and purposes of Buddhist meditation
practice doesn't differ from the Jesuits? missionary reports and their
interpreters of the seventeenth and eighteenth century on the interior
doctrine of the religion of Fo. Even the self-deification of Buddhists
through quietistic meditation is preserved by Hegel into the nineteenth
century. Moreover, Hegel's reception of Buddhism provides evidence that
in Europe the Jesuits still had almost a monopoly on information about
Buddhism in the beginning of the nineteenth century, though the Jesuit
order had just gone through its most serious crisis since its foundation
in 1540, namely the suspension of the Jesuit order from 1773 to 1815.
In the West the accusations
of quietism were not questioned until late in the nineteenth century.
First the representatives of the "new" Buddhism (shin
bukkyo) in post-Meiji restoration Japan tried to clear up this
misconception. They emphasized that Buddhism was not quietist at all,
that it was not a religion that existed at the expense of working people,
but that Buddhism was a social religion and that Buddhists were productive
and helpful members of society, which lived according to the guiding
principle that the one who does not work also does not need to eat.
Influenced by the political, cultural, and religious changes at home,
D. T. Suzuki argued in his articles and lectures for Zen Buddhism's
social compatibility. Rudolf Otto adopted this concept of practicing
Zen Buddhists and even endorsed the Christian maxim "ora et
labora" for them. Here you cannot only feel Suzuki's influence
on Rudolf Otto's work, but also Japan's positive image among the German
population in the first half of the twentieth century — the Japanese
were regarded as the Prussians of Asia. (15)
Summary
This short history of
the idea of Buddhism shows that the reception of Buddhism in Europe
can only be understood in the context of the religious, political or
social discourses occurring at the time. During the passing on of the
Buddhist religion into European culture it was not the subject of faith
that was discussed; what really received attention and interest were
the theological, philosophical, social, and political questions in Europe,
which could be either supported or refuted by Buddhism. Thus the atheistic
Buddhists described in the Jesuit missionary letters became unbelieving
Protestants in Europe. For the Protestants the Buddhist idolaters became
Asian papists, quietist Buddhists became Jansenites and sodomite Buddhists
are just like the Protestants, the true whores of Babylon. The Christian
martyrs in the Jesuit theatre, which despite the advanced methods of
torture used by the Buddhists, imperturbably adhered to their Catholic
faith, should not inspire the onlookers to take the next boat to East
Asia to defend Christianity in Japan. The destiny of the Japanese martyrs
ought to serve as a pattern for the European Catholics, to adhere to
their Catholic faith despite all the hostilities from Protestants, Calvinists,
and Jansenites. The actual enemy is not a Buddhist, but the non-believers
on our doorsteps. The list of how Buddhists fall into decline as empirical
support for arguments to harm the religious, political, or private enemy
could be continued without great effort.
Through the letters
of the Jesuits and the accounts of the travel authors, European ideas
and conceptions, taken out of their western context, were applied to
the Asian Buddhists. By missionary letters and travel literature these
conceptions that were foisted upon Buddhism now made their way back
to Europe, where as a result Buddhism could then without problem be
compared with the western conditions.
This type of reception
of Buddhism is not confined to Jesuits or philosophers of the Enlightenment
only, but similar things occurred for example in D. T. Suzuki's and
Rudolf Otto's attempts to bring Zen Buddhism closer to a western audience.
D. T. Suzuki partially adopted western theological or scientific discourses
(e.g. psychology) in order to show that Zen Buddhism is the epitome
of everything Japanese. Rudolf Otto strove to understand the true nature
of the Japanese Zen Buddhism on the basis of his numinous philosophy
of religion, which was a construct of German religious idealism.
With these comprehensive
reflections regarding the reception of Buddhism in Europe I would like
to conclude my article. Buddhism had with the help of missionaries and
travel writers on its long journey finally arrived in Europe. But how
it subsequently established itself in its new home and whether it adapted
well in its new environment, is another story of religion, which I cannot
tell here.
Sources
Almond, Philip C. 1994.
"Rudolf Otto and Buddhism." Aspects of Religion: Essays
in Honour of Ninian Smart. Peter Masefield & Donald Wiebe (eds.).
New York. 59-71.
Batchelor, Stephen.
1994. The Awakening of the West: The Encounter of Buddhism and Western
Culture. Berkeley.
Caron, François & Schouten, Joost. 1935. A True Description
of the Mighty Kingdoms of Japan & Siam. Reprinted from the
English Edition of 1663 with Introduction, Notes and Appendixes by C.R.
Boxer. London.
Correia-Afonso, John.
1969. Jesuit Letters and Indian History. Oxford.
Delumeau, Jean. 1977.
Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire: a New View of the Counter-Reformation.
London.
Du Halde, Jean-Baptiste.
1741. The General History of China. London.
Febvre, Lucien.1982.
The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century. The Religion of
Rabelais. Cambridge.
Hegel G. W. H. 1971.
Sämtliche Werke. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der
Religion. Bd.15. Hermann Glockner (ed.). Stuttgart.
Hekma, Gert. 1989. "Sodomites, Platonic Lovers, Contrary Lovers:
The Backgrounds of the Modern Homosexual." The Pursuit of Sodomy:
Male Homosexuality in Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe. Kent
Gerard & Gert Hekma (eds.). New York. 433-455.
Ho, John. 1962 Quellenuntersuchung zur Chinakenntnis bei Leibniz
und Wolff. Hong Kong.
Hunter, M. & Wootton,
D. (eds.). 1992. Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment.
Oxford.
Jordan, Mark D. 1997. The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology.
Chicago.
King, Richard. 1999.
Orientalism and Religion. Postcolonial Theory, India and 'The Mystic
East'. London.
Kors, Charles Alan.
1990. Atheism in France, 1650 — 1729. Vol. I: The Orthodox
Sources of Disbelief. Princeton.
Leibniz, G. W. 1879.
Die Theodicee. G. W. Leibniz Philosophische Werke. Bd.4. Ernst
Cassirer (ed.), J. H. von Kirchmann (trans.). Leipzig.
Lopez, Donald S. (ed.).
1995. Curators of the Buddha. Chicago.
Minimaki, G. 1985. The
Chinese Rites Controversy: From its Beginnings to Modern Times.
Chicago.
Mungello, D. (ed.).1994.
The Chinese Rites Controversy. Its History and Meaning. San
Francisco.
Northeast, Catherine
M. 1991. The Parisian Jesuits and the Enlightenment 1700 — 1762.
Oxford.
O'Keefe, Cyril B. 1974.
Contemporary Reactions to the Enlightenment: (1728 — 1762): A
Study of Three Critical Journals: the Jesuit Journal de Trévoux,
the Jansenist Nouvelles ecclésiastiques, and the Secular Journal
des savants. Paris.
Offermanns, Jürgen.
2002. Der lange Weg des Zen-Buddhismus nach Deutschland. Vom 16.
Jahrhundert bis Rudolf Otto. Lund.
Pott, Martin. 1990.
Aufklärung und Aberglaube, Die deutsche Frühaufklärung
im Spiegel ihrer Aberglaubenskritik. Tübingen.
Schurhammer, Georg.
1973. Franz Xaver: sein Leben und seine Zeit. Japan und China 1549
— 1552. Bd. 2/3. Freiburg i.B.
Schuster, Ingrid. 1988.
Vorbilder und Zerrbilder. China und Japan im Spiegel der deutschen
Literatur 1773 — 1890. Bern.
Sindemann, Kerstin-Katja. 2003. "Der japanische Buddhismus in den
Jesuitenbriefen des 16. Jahrhunderts. Auf den Spuren frühneuzeitlicher
Buddhismusrezeption in Europa." Religion im Spiegelkabinett.
Asiatische Religionsgeschichte im Spannungsfeld von Orientalismus und
Okzidentalismus. Peter Schalk (ed.). Uppsala, 115-143.
Spence, Jonathan. 1985. The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci.
New York.
Szarota, Elida Maria.
(1979 — 1983) Das Jesuitendrama im deutschen Sprachgebiet.
München.
Endnotes
(1)
Cp. Batchelor 1994:231; King 1999:144; Lopez 1995:2. Return
to Text
(2)
Reg. the Jesuits reception of Japanese Buddhism in the sixteenth century
and their knowledge about the Buddhist tradition, cp. Sindemann 2003.
Return to Text
(3) Reg.
Jesuit letters, cp. Correia-Afonso 1969.Return to Text
(4) Reg.
the Jesuit theatre, cp. Szarota 1979; reg. Jesuit plays on Japan, cp.
Schuster 1988:65-125, reg. the Buddhists’ part on the Jesuit stage,
cp. Offermanns 2002:96-104.Return to Text
(5) Reg.
atheism in the period from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, cp.
Hunter & Wooton 1992.Return to Text
(6) Reg.
the Rites Controversy, cp. Minimaki 1985, Mungello 1994.Return
to Text
(7) For
more information on atheism as consequence of madness, homosexuality
etc., cp. Kors 1990:17-43.Return to Text
(8) Reg.
the Jesuit discussion about atheism in France during the Enlightenment,
cp. Northeast 1991:79-105.Return to Text
(9) Pensées
diverses écrites à un Docteur de Sorbonne, à l'occasion
de la Comète qui parut au mois de Décembre MDCLXXX.Return
to Text
(10)
Reg. Jesuits' criticism of the Enlightenment, cp. O'Keefe 1974.Return
to Text
(11) The
German Protestant theologian R. Otto applied his theory of the numinous
experience as the origin and core of all religion to Zen Buddhism. Through
his positive rendering of Zen Buddhism, which was strongly influenced
by D. T. Suzuki, Otto succeeded in arousing interest in Zen Buddhism
in the West. Reg. Otto's reception of Buddhism, cp. Almond 1994, reg.
Otto and Zen Buddhism, cp. Offermanns 2002:255-292.Return
to Text
(12) Hekma
1989:434. Reg. Aquina's interpration of sodomy, cp. Jordan 1997, chapter
seven.Return to Text
(13) For
more information on Caron and his Mighty Kingdoms, cp. C.R. Boxer's
introduction in Caron & Schouten 1935.Return to Text
(14) Reg.
Leibniz's China sources, cp. Ho 1962.Return to Text
(15) Reg.
the early reception of Zen/Buddhism in Europe/Germany, cp. Offermanns
2002.Return to Text